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1 General Introduction
“Labels can help some people sometimes in some cases”.
(Rotfeld 2009, p. 375)
1.1 Relevance
As stated by the World Health Organization, health problems caused by unhealthy food
intake are increasing (WHO 2012). Reduction of nutrition-related health problems is a
major challenge of the 21st century, because millions of adults die each year as a result
of being overweight or obese (Ng et al. 2014). Additionally, the incidents of diabetes,
cancer, and cardiovascular diseases accountable to excessive consumption of unhealthy
nutrition are steadily rising. Against this background, nutrition labeling is regarded as
one potential instrument to induce the necessary dietary change and influence consump-
tion behavior. Grunert and Wills (2007, p. 385) define nutrition labeling as “an attempt
to provide consumers, at the point of purchase, with information about nutrition content
of individual food products, in order to enable consumers to choose nutritionally appro-
priate food.”
A large amount of research has analyzed different types and formats of nutrition label-
ing in respect to perception, understanding, and use (Campos et al. 2011; Cowburn and
Stockley 2005; Drichoutis et al. 2006; Friedman 1972; Glanz and Mullis 1988; Glanz et al.
1992; Grunert and Wills 2007; Hersey et al. 2013; Mayer et al. 1989; Kiesel et al. 2011;
Mhurchu and Gorton 2007; Moorman 1996; Seymour et al. 2004; van Kleef and Dagevos
2015; vant Riet 2012).
Research with self-reported study designs indicate that consumers have a positive attitude
towards nutrition information on food packages and appear able to choose healthier op-
tions using any labeling scheme (Storcksdieck and Wills 2012). However, results based on
self-reports can be biased by social desirability (Glanz et al. 1992), because respondents
know that healthy purchase behavior is respected in society. Post-hoc rationalization is
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also stated as a source for bias of self-reports of nutrition label use and healthier pur-
chase behavior (Malam et al. 2009). According to this so-called recall bias, respondents
make decisions in a habitual way, where a post-hoc rationalization of label use does not
necessarily have to match the real reasons for their decision. Furthermore, Radimer and
Harvey (1998) and Rayner et al. (2001) have found that respondents reported label use
and healthier consumption while their observed behavior did not confirm this. There-
fore, consumers’ self-reports of label use are not considered a reliable measure for the
effectiveness of nutrition labeling in product choices (van Herpen et al. 2012). A general
confirmation that nutrition labeling induces healthier purchase behavior in real-life set-
tings is still missing. Research with real purchase data from supermarkets reveal mixed
results regarding the effectiveness of nutrition labels in promoting healthier purchase be-
havior (see previous research section).
Therefore, many authors still call for more research with real purchase data that analyzes
the impact of nutrition labels (Andrews et al. 2014; Hersey et al. 2013; Lachat and Tseng
2013; vant Riet 2012). In addition to the above mentioned drawbacks of self-reported
study designs, a review by TinTin et al. (2007) constitutes that real purchase data should
be regarded as superior for the examination of food purchase patterns.
The contribution of our three studies is to fill this research gap by analyzing the im-
pact of nutrition label introduction with real purchase behavior. Our results will extend
knowledge in this field in several ways. First, previous research analyzing the impact of
nutrition labeling with real purchase data has utilized aggregated data. In our first study,
we use a disaggregated approach to account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity
of consumers. We compare these results to an aggregated counterpart.
Second, in most previous studies sales or market share was analyzed as dependent vari-
able. We use the amount of sugar and fat purchased in the food products as dependent
variable in our second study. Novel to nutrition label research is that we also examine the
outcome for the retailer due to the voluntary introduction of nutrition labeling. So far,
only experimental research has analyzed retailers benefits of voluntary nutrition labeling
in terms of attitudes and behavioral intentions of respondents. Attitudes alone are often
6
poor predictors of marketplace behavior (Ajzen 2001; Vermeir and Verbeke 2006) and,
hence, research with observed behavior is deemed necessary to gain further insights into
retailer benefits from voluntary nutrition labeling (Newman et al. 2014).
The voluntary nutrition label introduction under investigation provides the opportunity
to analyze how the non-governmental induced labeling scheme may be attributed to mar-
keting efforts rather than promoting healthier purchase behavior. Therefore, we analyze
the dual role of voluntary nutrition labels in promoting healthier purchase behavior in
our third study. While previous research has emphasized on a general effect of nutrition
labeling towards healthier purchase behavior, we investigate more nuanced effects of vol-
untary nutrition disclosure.
1.2 Previous Research
In this section, we summarize the results of previous research analyzing the influence of
nutrition labeling on consumer behavior through real purchase data from supermarkets.
Our selection criterion were peer-reviewed published studies until 2013 which analyze the
influence of nutrition disclosure at supermarkets using purchase data. We exclude results
from away-from-home eating places due to different choice situations by consumers (for
reviews to this topic, see Harnack and French 2008; Seymour et al. 2004; Swartz et al.
2011).
To obtain a comprehensive overview about nutrition labeling, we review several formats of
nutrition disclosure available at the point-of-purchase. The formats are in-store-posters,
shelf-labeling, back-of-pack (B-O-P), and front-of-pack (F-O-P) labels. We exclude re-
search examining take-away booklets as the only format of nutrition disclosure (see, for
example, Soriano and Dozier 1978). This is due to the fact that the process of collecting
nutrition information by take-away booklets is different from the other mentioned formats.
Consumers are actively involved in gaining access to nutrition information from booklets,
while the other formats reveal the nutrition information unasked at the point-of-purchase.
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This ensures comparability of the findings discussed in this section with the front-of-pack
labeling implementation in our studies. In Tables 1 and 2, we summarize the relevant
information from the previous studies plus our three studies.
We first describe the content of the last column to support the classification of the other
columns. It summarizes the outcome of the studies according to five criteria. If there is
no significant effect of the label implementation on the dependent variable, the results are
classified as “Null result.” When only a certain number of categories in the analysis show
healthier purchase behavior the term “(X) out of (Y) categories” is used. If all analyzed
categories show the same direction regarding healthiness this is indicated with “healthier
purchases” or “unhealthier purchases.” “Mixed results” indicate that the label introduc-
tion leads to healthier purchase behavior in some categories, and unhealthier purchase
behavior in other categories.
Our first finding from Tables 1 and 2 is that 18 out of the 21 previous studies were con-
ducted in the USA (Country). We summarize the number of different stores available
in the datasets of the studies (# of stores), number of different food categories (# of
categories) and the total number of different items in parentheses below (# of items). Six
studies reveal an unambiguous significant effect of nutrition labeling, where five of these
studies only utilize one category for analysis. This fact impairs the generalizability of
these results. Therefore, we analyze different food categories across our studies to ensure
a certain degree of generalizability.
The time-span of the studies (Time-span) ranges from 2 weeks to 9 years. Studies with
short periods used for analysis do not allow to factor in seasonal characteristics or long-
term response, therefore the time-span of our studies is chosen accordingly (at least 2
years). Furthermore, we classify the studies in Tables 1 and 2 into two different designs
(Study design). Experimental designs are those where a set of treatment stores with
nutrition labeling are compared to a set of control stores without this labeling. The Inter-
vention designs examine introductions of nutrition labels by comparing purchase behavior
before and after label implementation. The type of study design is related to the publi-
cation year of the study. The first studies, mostly experimental designs, have been the
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decision support for the real label implementations analyzed in follow-up studies since the
1990s. However, there appears no relationship between the study design and the outcome.
The different label formats in our summary are in-store-posters, shelf-labeling, B-O-P and
F-O-P labels, or any kind of combination of these different approaches (Label format).
We observe the historical development of nutrition label formats in this column. Early
realizations are in-store-posters in combination with take-away booklets which changed to
B-O-P and, thereafter, F-O-P labels in subsequent years. We do not observe a relation-
ship between the label formats and the outcome. According to Hersey et al. (2013), the
two general types of label information in the previous studies are nutrient-specific labels
and summary systems (Information). Nutrient-specific labels disclose a few key nutrition
values, while summary systems provide an evaluation of the food products subject to cer-
tain health guidelines or claims, such as ‘low fat.’ In most previous studies, unit-sales or
share of unit-sales of food products is assumed to be influenced by the label introduction
(Effect on).
In summary, the results from the previous studies do not reveal a clear picture of the ef-
fectiveness of nutrition labeling on consumers’ purchase patterns. The ability of nutrition
labels to promote healthier purchase behavior, in general, is not supported. No specific
label format or information type outperforms any other constellation when examined in
a real-life setting, while other research has revealed that consumers prefer the easily ac-
cessible front-of-pack summary systems with low processing costs (Hersey et al. 2013;
van Kleef and Dagevos 2015). Due to the ambiguous results of label research with real
purchase data, authors demand more studies in this field (Andrews et al. 2014; Hersey
et al. 2013; Lachat and Tseng 2013; vant Riet 2012). With our three studies, we aim to
fill this important research gap and to contribute to the field of nutrition labeling through
the application of real purchase data from a food retailer.
In the last three rows of Table 2, we summarize our three studies. Study 1 is the first
study where disaggregated data is utilized to analyze response to nutrition labeling. We
compare these results to an aggregated model with the same data and reveal that the
different specifications yield in different results. Our results provide useful insights for
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consumer characteristics which may influence the effectiveness of nutrition label intro-
duction to promote healthier purchase behavior.
In Study 2, we use the sugar and fat amount of food products as the dependent variable
instead of sales or market share. Furthermore, this is the first study where the outcome
of nutrition labeling for retailers is analyzed in a real-life setting. Combining consumer
response with retailer’s outcome sheds light into both sides which are affected by the
introduction of nutrition labels.
In Study 3, we analyze the interaction between two types of nutrition information. A
summary system, which was present before the nutrition label introduction, may lead to
more nuanced effects of consumer response after the label introduction. Furthermore, we
investigate how a specific component on the nutrition label chosen by the retailer can
have an effect on consumer response. In our third study, we will give insights about the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Front of pack (FOP) nutrition labeling has received extensive political attention within the
last years. The European Commission proposed making FOP nutrition labeling manda-
tory in order to guide consumers toward making healthier food choices. Most studies
looking at the influence of nutrition labeling focus on consumer attention to labels, and
very few concentrate on the effects on actual purchase behavior. In this study, we present
results from an analysis of scanner data provided by a large UK retailer. We focus on
two food categories using store-brand products which are labeled with a front of pack
monochrome guideline daily amount (GDA) label. The analyzes are based on economic
methods at both an aggregated and disaggregated level to enable us to identify as many
influencing factors on food choice as possible. We utilize the SSAg/1 health score for our
food categories as a dependent variable for both models in order to obtain an objective
measure of healthiness.
Our results suggest that GDA label introduction leads to healthier purchase behavior in
the aggregated model, but not in the disaggregated model. Price and habitual purchase
behavior generally have a larger impact on purchase behavior and product choice than
the GDA label introduction.
Study 2
Nutrition labeling is considered a helpful tool to promote healthier food consumption.
While governmental stakeholders repeatedly ask for improvement of mandatory labeling
of food products, retailers have discovered voluntary front-of-pack labeling as a marketing
strategy. Previous research has analyzed how consumers react and how retailers benefit
from implementing such labeling schemes. While experimental research reveals healthier
purchase behavior and improvement in attitudes towards retailers, research with real
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purchase data is still short of evidence about the effectiveness of front-of-pack nutrition
labels or the impact on retailers’ benefits. This study analyzes the impact of front-
of-pack nutrition labeling on consumers’ food energy purchase behavior and revenue-
concerned metrics of retailers. Results suggest that the front-of-pack nutrition label leads
to slightly healthier purchase behavior by the customers, but does not increase store
loyalty intentions. If healthier purchase behavior is observed, it is accompanied with
reduced volume and, therefore, less revenue. This shows that potential health benefits for
customers can come at a cost for retailers.
Study 3
Consumers’ attention to nutrition content in their food choice decision is steadily increas-
ing. Food marketing has adapted this change in behavior by emphasizing nutritional ad-
vantages of particular food products. Hence, nutrition claims (e.g. ‘low fat’) and nutrition
labels are popular means by marketers. Nutrition information should guide consumers to
choose healthier food products, but the use of claims and labels can create health halos
by increasing perceived healthiness when its not justified. This study uses supermarket
scanner data to analyze the dual role of nutrition labels in fighting health halos.
On the one hand, results suggest that nutrition labels can correct for misleading nutrition
claims. On the other hand, nutrition labels that report too small serving sizes as basis
for recommended daily amount unjustifiably increase perceived healthiness, which leads
to an increase in sales volume in our study. These results provide important implications
for food marketers and public policy.
14
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2 Are Consumers Influenced in their Food Choice by
Monochrome Guideline Daily Amount Nutrition
Labels?
(with Yasemin Boztuğ, Hans J. Juhl and Morten B. Jensen)
This paper (Study 1) is based on:
EU Project FLABEL Deliverable (2012, Workpackage 6): How GDA-nutrition labels on
food products affect product choice. (Contract No: 211905)
A previous version of this paper (Study 1) is published as:
Boztuğ, Juhl, Elshiewy, and Jensen (2012): Are Consumers influenced in their Food
Choice by Health Labels? Proceedings of the 41th EMAC Conference, Lisbon, Portugal.
This version is currently under 3rd round review in Food Policy.
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2.1 Study 1: Introduction
Lifestyle-related illnesses such as cardiovascular diseases can be attributed to poor diet
and a lack of physical activity (Grunert et al. 2010; James et al. 2004; Schor et al. 2010;
Verbeke 2008; WHO 2012). In many European countries, these adverse health behaviors
lead to large costs for both the individual and for society. Nutrition labeling has been
cited as a way of providing information to consumers that supports health-conscious food
choices (Commission of the European Communities 2008). It is assumed that consumers
are likely to use the nutritional information provided and change their behavior resulting
in the purchase of healthier products (Grunert and Wills 2007; Russo et al. 1986)
In 1990, the US Food and Drug Administration Authority regulated that all pre-packed
food products in the US should display nutritional information in the form of a NLEA la-
bel, which is typically cited on the back of the package (Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act 1990). Nutrition labeling has also recently become mandatory within the European
Union as a result of the ’Provision of Food Information to Consumers’ legislation (EU
No 1169/2011). This legislation requires pre-packaged foods to display energy value and
amounts of fat, saturated fat, carbohydrates, protein, sugar, and salt in the same field of
vision, most typically on the back of the package.
While comprehensive back-of-pack (BOP) nutrition information is already present on a
wide range of foods across Europe (Storcksdieck et al. 2010), the average consumer has
neither the time nor the inclination to analyze this level of information at the point of
purchase (Drichoutis et al. 2006). In order to make it easier for the consumer to distin-
guish between healthy and less healthy products government bodies and the food industry
have developed a variety of front-of-pack (FOP) nutritional labeling schemes.
One of the most prevalent FOP labeling schemes communicates the percentage of the
Guideline Daily Amount (GDA) for energy, fat, saturated fat, sugar, and salt that a
portion of food contains. The GDA is the labeling scheme that has typically been fa-
vored by the industry. Guideline Daily Amounts were derived from the COMA report
(Wiseman 1992) on daily reference values and are promoted by the industry organiza-
17
tion FoodDrinkEurope. Another prevalent system which was developed by the UK Food
Standards Agency (2007) overlays interpretative color and text onto the nutritional values
for fat, saturated fat, sugar, and salt. This scheme indicates the levels of those nutrients
in 100 grams of the food as high (red), medium (amber), or low (green). A number of
major retailers within the UK and across Europe have adopted the use of this type of
traffic light FOP labeling (Grunert and Wills 2007). In a number of European countries,
other retailers have taken a different route and adopted a more directive and aggregated
system as FOP labeling approach. The Swedish keyhole (Larsson et al. 1999) and the
smart choices logo (Lupton et al. 2010) are examples where a simple visual symbol or
’health logo’ indicates a food item is healthier than others within the same food category
without the need for the consumer to process any nutritional information (Hodgkins et al.
2012). A more detailed discussion of the various types of FOP nutrition labeling is given
by Hersey et al. (2013) and van Kleef and Dagevos (2015).
The recent EU regulation (EU No 1169/2011) does not legislate mandatory front-of-pack
nutrition labeling, but it does allow for the energy value to be repeated in the principal
field of vision either alone or in conjunction with per-portion values for fat, saturated
fat, sugar, and salt. Additional forms of expression and presentation of FOP labels, such
as Guideline Daily Amounts (GDA), traffic lights or health logos, are currently being
reviewed by the Commission.
Grunert and Wills (2007) present a review of European research on consumer response
to nutrition information on food labels. The response variables include perception, lik-
ing, understanding and use of nutrition labels. Research with real purchase data from
away-from-home eating places reveal mixed results regarding the effectiveness of nutri-
tion labels in promoting healthier purchase behavior (for reviews, see Harnack and French
2008; Swartz et al. 2011). The same holds for research investigating the impact of nu-
trition labels at supermarkets (see e.g., Hersey et al. 2013; vant Riet 2012). Studies
analyzing the influence of FOP labeling on consumer behavior using real purchase data
are rare, so that many authors call for more research in this area (Andrews et al. 2014;
Feunekes et al. 2008; Hersey et al. 2013; Lachat and Tseng 2013; vant Riet 2012). The few
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studies which use real purchase data do not show a generalizable impact of FOP labeling
on consumer behavior at supermarkets. Balasubramanian and Cole (2002) found mixed
results regarding healthier purchase behavior for eight different food categories. Similarly,
Sacks et al. (2009) and Sacks et al. (2011) could not show an impact on the healthiness
of foods purchased following the introduction of a traffic light FOP label.
The objective of our study is to gain further insights into consumers’ response to the in-
troduction of FOP nutrition labeling. Our study adds to existing literature in two ways.
First, we analyze real purchase data as recommended by recent research. We have access
to a large data set from a UK retailer including information about store brands sales,
product characteristics, and consumer characteristics for one year before and after label
introduction of a monochrome GDA labeling scheme (as shown in Figure 1). We study
the potential effect of the GDA label introduction on market share and choice in selected
food categories.
Figure 1: Example of a monochrome GDA label.
Second, we study the effects of the monochrome GDA label introduction not only on
an aggregate level, as in all previous studies analyzing nutrition label effectiveness with
purchase data, but also on an individual basis. We have information about two different
food categories (yogurt and ready meals). To our knowledge, this is the first study
analyzing FOP label effects at different data aggregation levels, comparing the outcome
of both approaches. This is also the first study to investigate the effectiveness of the
monochrome GDA label. We control for price, trends and seasonality at the aggregated
market share level, but we also study the effects of the GDA labeling at the disaggregated
level. This is accomplished by estimating the effects of the labeling format based on a
discrete choice model with price, promotional activity, and consumer characteristics.
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2.2 Study 1: Dataset
The data utilized for analysis is provided by a major retailer located in the United King-
dom. Three different datasets are available. The first dataset contains purchase transac-
tions of loyalty card members purchasing the retailer’s store brands. The time span of
purchase transactions is from May 2005 until April 2007. The food categories yogurt and
ready meals are available for analysis. Within each food category, we group the products
based on an objective measure of healthiness, as will be explained later.
The dataset contains 75 different yogurt products accounting for nearly 20 million pur-
chase transactions for the yogurt category as well as over 3,000 different ready meals
products accounting for 30 million transactions. Furthermore, the transaction dataset
provides information about the consumer ID, the date of purchase, the product ID, quan-
tity, unit price in pennies and whether the product was purchased on discount. The
second dataset provides information about the product IDs, with product size in grams,
and different nutrition values per 100 grams. For each product ID, we calculate a health
index using the SSAg/1 measure (Rayner et al. 2004) as described in Table 3. The SSAg/1
measure enables the calculation of an overall objective health score for a given product.
In addition, the SSAg/1 measure focuses on unhealthy components of the food which are
typically included in the monochrome GDA label (calories, fat, saturated fat, sugar, salt).
Healthier food products have lower values of the SSAg/1 score.
SSAg/1
Scoring bands per 100 gram (g) as follows:
Energy value: 0-895kJ = 0; 895-1790kJ = 1; 1790-2685kJ = 2; etc.
Saturated fat value: 0-2.6g = 0; 2.6-5.2g = 1; 5.2-7.8g = 2; etc.
Sugar value: 0-6.3g = 0; 6.3-12.6g = 1; 12.6-18.9g = 2; etc.
Sodium value: 0-0.235g = 0; 0.235-0.470g = 1; 0.470-0.705g = 2; etc.
SSAg/1 value = Energy value + Saturated fat value + Sugar value + Sodium value
Table 3: Calculation of the SSAg/1 health score
In the yogurt category, we obtain health scores from 0 up to 3, while in the ready meals
category, we end up with values in the range between 0 and 4 and a final group of products
20
with health scores above 4 (5+).
The third dataset includes consumer-specific information stated at the time of the ap-
plication for the loyalty card program such as gender. The share of female loyalty card
holders purchasing during the time span of the study is 75% in the yogurt category and
73% in the ready meals category.
Combining product and consumer information with the transaction dataset generates the
final dataset for the analysis. The GDA label introduction date is May 2006. Therefore,
we use a dummy variable with “0” for the transactions before May 2006, and “1” for the
periods May 2006 and later.
For our aggregated model, we calculate for each food category (yogurt and ready meals)
and each health level (yogurt with i = 0 to 3 and ready meals with i = 0 to 5+) sales in
kg (salesit) and the mean price per kg (priceit) per week (t).
For the disaggregated model, we randomly select 400 consumers (n) with at least 20 pur-
chase transactions for each product category to reduce computational costs for parameter
estimation. Every purchase decision is taken as a choice among the different health levels.
The mean price per kg (priceit) and the share of transactions on discount (discountit)
is calculated per week and per health level. For the repeated choices, a loyalty mea-
sure (loyaltynit) for each individual, health level and week is calculated as introduced by
Guadagni and Little (1983). We choose the value for α as 0.75 to weigh the last purchase
with 75% and the smoothed average of the purchases before the last purchase with 25%
(for a more detailed explanation, see Guadagni and Little 1983). The two variables in-
cluded in the analysis which do not vary over alternatives are the gender dummy set as
“1” for the female applicants (gendern) and the label dummy set as “1” for the choice
situations starting from May 2006 flagging the presence of the GDA label (labelt).
Tables 4 and 5 show summary statistics for sales in kg, price, and the share of transac-
tions on discounts for the yogurt and ready meals data. The mean value (Mean) and the
standard deviation (SD) is shown for each food category and health level, also supple-
mented with the overall mean and SD. Note that food products with higher health levels
are classified as less healthy. Thus, the healthiest products in each food category have
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health levels of 0. The unhealthiest products in the yogurt category have the health level
of 3. All products in the ready meals category with a health level of 5 and above are
summarized into the least healthy level of 5+. In summary, the total sales in kg in the
yogurt category exceed the sales in the ready meals category. The mean price per kg and
the share of transactions on discount is higher for the ready meals category within each
health level and across all health levels. A noteworthy observation is that the mean price
per kg increases with increasing health level in the ready meals category. This implies
that less healthy ready meals are, on average, more expensive than healthier ready meals.
This fact confirms the need for price to be taken into account as an explanatory variable
for the upcoming models.
yogurt
Health level 0 1 2 3 overall
salesit
Mean 9,554,786 26,002,991 25,245,382 4,363,407 16,291,642
SD 1,154,519 2,820,388 3,472,141 497,403 9,803,675
priceit
Mean 124.6 119.5 117.7 141.2 125.8
SD 3.2 14.1 8.6 41.5 24.2
discountit
Mean 0 0.04 0.06 0 0.03
Table 4: Summary statistics for yogurt
ready meals
Health level 0 1 2 3 4 5+ overall
salesit
Mean 46,510 50,903 33,512 11,088 7,724 5,022 25,793
SD 6,947 5,164 9,607 5,627 2,276 1,301 19,582
priceit
Mean 407.9 422.7 488.1 656.4 576.0 737.1 548.0
SD 22.6 17.6 23.3 51.4 49.9 51.8 126.8
discountit
Mean 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.21
Table 5: Summary statistics for ready meals
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2.3 Study 1: Methodology
In previous research, different model types have been applied in order to estimate the
effect of nutrition label introduction. The estimates were typically based on aggregated
data. For example, Balasubramanian and Cole (2002) model market share as a function
of market share in the previous period and did not include other explanatory variables
apart from a label dummy indicating when the label was introduced. In Mathios (1996),
a regression model is estimated with the number of units sold for a given product as the
dependent variable. The model has labeling information, average consumer characteristics
on store level and average price in the product category as explanatory variables. Mathios
(1998, 2000) and Mojduszka et al. (2001) models were combinations of conditional logit
models and sales models, but the dependent variable was the relative market share per
week for a given product. Sacks et al. (2009) also conducted an aggregate sales analysis
using a linear mixed model. Further studies were carried out as experiments with a
comparison of treatment and control stores regarding the outcome of healthiness. For
example, Berning et al. (2011) and Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2013) compared the influence
of nutrition labeling on sales of unhealthy food products in treatment stores with nutrition
labels to sales in control stores without nutrition labels using a difference-in-difference
model.
We use two modeling approaches for our analysis. We start with an aggregated market
share analysis based on a market share attraction model (MSA). Extending the time-
series approach of Balasubramanian and Cole (2002), we include marketing-mix variables
such as price, and we also adjust for effects across the different levels of healthiness.
Furthermore, we estimate the label effect with a difference-in-difference approach taken
from interrupted time series designs (see e.g. Morgan and Winship 2007; Capacci and
Mazzocchi 2011). The outcome (market share attraction) in the aggregated model, which
is influenced by the GDA label introduction, has a continuous level of measurement.
The difference-in-difference approach, therefore, estimates the causal effect of the label
introduction on market share attraction of each health category.
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In a second step, we estimate a disaggregated choice model. Analyzing choices on a
disaggregated level gives the opportunity to account for heterogeneous consumers and to
gain insights into the underlying individual choice process. For this approach, we estimate
a multinomial logit model (MNL) with the label introduction as well as price, promotional
activity and consumer characteristics as explanatory variables for each individual. The
outcome of this model is a discrete choice indicator for each alternative. The choice
probability for the alternatives is derived by the difference of the explanatory variables
so that external effects are captured by influencing all characteristics. This approach
analyzes the influence on the purchase sequences of the consumers while the label effect
remains comparable to the aggregated market share model. In the following section, we
will explain both procedures in more detail.
Aggregated Market Share Model
The market share attraction model (MSA) was introduced by Nakanishi and Cooper
(1974). A market share for a given brand or health level (in our case a group of yogurt
or ready meals with the same level of healthiness) is defined as the share of attraction
that this health level has in a market consisting of health levels. The attraction related to
products at a given health level is assumed to be a function of a number of explanatory
variables (e.g. price or product attributes). In particular, we assume that attraction also
depends on the presence or absence of the GDA label.
We model the market share of health level i based on sales in kg compared to the healthi-
est level 0 as a function of price and presence/absence of the GDA label. In the appendix,
we show how the parameters obtained from the estimation can be interpreted. We also
discuss the expected signs of these differences.
To account for the causal effect of the GDA label introduction on the outcome with a
continuous level of measurement, we apply a difference-in-difference estimation from inter-
rupted time-series designs (Morgan and Winship 2007, p. 244). We estimate one market
share attraction model for the periods before the label introduction (pre-model) and a
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second model for the periods after label introduction (post-model). We predict the time
periods after the label introduction with the parameter estimates from the pre-model (Ỹ0)
and the post-model (Ỹ1). As described by Capacci and Mazzocchi (2011), the treatment
effect (GDA label introduction) is calculated as E(Ỹ1) − E(Ỹ0). In our case, a positive
(negative) treatment effect means that the attraction of health level i compared to health
level 0 increases (decreases) after the GDA label introduction. We expect that the attrac-
tion of food products with higher health levels decreases compared to the healthiest level
after GDA label introduction.
This approach takes into account a number of possible effects on the attraction of prod-
ucts belonging to a given health level. First, we model time-independent effects by the
intercepts. Second, we also capture time-varying effects influencing all health levels, such
as seasonality, by studying the fraction between market shares of different health levels.
Third, we capture autocorrelation using lagged dependent variables. One possible expla-
nation for significant autocorrelation is the existence of a persistence effect of consumption
and, therefore, correction for such an effect is also included in our approach.
Disaggregated Choice Model
The multinomial logit model (MNL) was introduced by McFadden (1974). The model
estimates the choice probability of a decision maker to choose an alternative out of a
given choice set. The choice probability is modeled as a function of different types of
explanatory variables. They are classified according to their variation across alternatives,
decision makers, and/or time. In our case, the decision makers are the different consumers
who choose a specific health level among the set of health levels from the healthiest to
the unhealthiest alternative according to the SSAg/1 health score.
The explanatory variables price and discount vary across alternatives (health levels) and
time. The loyalty measure varies across health levels and across consumers as well. The
influence of these variables on choice probability is denoted by one parameter in the model
for each explanatory variable, which captures the general linear effect of changes in the
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explanatory variables on the choice probability for each alternative (health level). To
account for unobserved heterogeneity, these parameters are estimated as random coef-
ficients via a mixing distribution leading to the random coefficient logit model (RCL).
This approach leads to additional parameter estimates of the standard deviation for each
parameter (sd.price, sd.discount, sd.loyalty). As explained by Train and Revelt (2000),
the standard deviation can be interpreted as the variation in consumers’ response to the
marketing-mix variables (price and discount) and the variation of the influence of the past
purchases (loyalty). In addition to the consideration of unobserved heterogeneity among
consumers, the RCL overcomes other limitations of the MNL. First, the restriction of
the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives assumption does not hold anymore. This as-
sumption denotes that the ratio of the probability of choosing one alternative to another
is independent from other alternatives and their attributes. This can be unrealistic for
the case where pairs of alternatives are perceived as more similar than other pairs of
alternatives. Using the RCL allows a more realistic approach for our health levels, where
consumers can perceive neighboring health levels as more similar than more distant health
levels. The RCL relaxes this assumption by allowing for dependencies between the ratio
of two alternatives and other alternatives (for further explanations, the reader is referred
to Luce 2005). Second, the MNL cannot cover unobserved factors such as repeated ob-
servations which tend to be correlated over time. Both limitations can be fixed using a
RCL model. A more elaborate description of the model is given in the Appendix.
The explanatory variables gender and label do not vary across alternatives, but across
consumers and/or time. The number of parameters to be estimated for gender and label
is equal to the number of alternatives minus one, because a baseline alternative (health
level) whose parameter is normalized to zero must be chosen. For each of the other alter-
natives the explanatory variable enters as dummy variable. This approach is necessary
in order to create differences over alternatives. The other parameter estimates can be
interpreted as effects compared to this baseline alternative (see for example, Train 2009,
p. 21). For our model, we have chosen the healthiest alternative (health level = 0) as the
baseline alternative to simplify the interpretation of the effects of the less healthy levels.
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This also enables the comparison of the results from the RCL model to the results from
the MSA model because changes in health level attraction in the MSA model are also
compared to the baseline category health level 0. Similar to the MSA model, we expect
that the choice probability for food products with higher health levels decreases compared
to the healthiest level after GDA label introduction. Furthermore, we include an interac-
tion term for gender and label to model the effect on the choice probability for a female
loyalty card holder facing the GDA label. Female consumers have higher health concerns
than male consumers, and are therefore more likely to use nutrition labels (Drichoutis
et al. 2006). We expect the effect for female customers to be stronger compared to male
customers regarding healthier choice behavior.
2.4 Study 1: Results
Aggregated Market Share Model
We present the results for the MSA model in Tables 6 and 7. The dependent variable
can be interpreted as the attraction of health level i compared to the healthiest level
0. The columns in the tables are classified according to the health level i (1-3 in the
yogurt category and 1-5+ in the ready meals category). For each explanatory variable,
we present the parameter estimates for the pre- and post-model in Tables 6 and 7.
We expect positive signs for log(price0) because the attraction of health level i should
increase compared to the baseline alternative health level 0 if the price of the healthiest
alternative increases. We expect negative signs for the parameter estimates of log(pricei).
If price increases, the attraction of health level i decreases compared to the baseline al-
ternative. Our expectations regarding the price coefficients are met entirely in the ready
meals category (see Table 7). All signs for log(price0) are positive and significant at the
1%-level. This significance level is met for the negative parameter estimates for log(pricei)
as well. We do not observe these results in the yogurt category. Some parameter esti-
mates meet our expectations as well as showing significance levels below 10%. This can
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Health Level 1 2 3
E(Ỹ1)− E(Ỹ0) 0.01 -0.07*** -0.02*
µi0 PRE -1.873 8.171 -4.461**
µi0 POST 7.502*** 13.571*** 5.684*
log(price0) PRE 0.177 -0.083 0.692*







log(msit−1) PRE 0.387** 1.197*** 0.460***
log(msit−1) POST 0.745*** 0.656*** 0.661***
log(ms0t−1) PRE -0.814*** -0.737*** -0.635***
log(ms0t−1) POST -0.551*** -0.392*** -0.480***
Adj.R2 PRE 0.82 0.94 0.33
Adj.R2 POST 0.21 0.69 0.20
Table 6: Results of the MSA model for yogurt
*Significant at the 0.1 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, ***Significant at the 0.01 level
be explained by less price conscious purchase behavior in the yogurt category. Neverthe-
less, with our parameter estimates for price level, we control for the influence of price
while assessing the impact of the GDA label introduction. We also present the param-
eter estimates for the lagged dependent variables of the market shares of health level i
(log(msit−1)) and 0 (log(ms0t−1)) in Tables 6 and 7. We observe for both food categories
a generalizable relationship between the lagged dependent variables and the dependent
variables. The parameter estimates for log(msit−1) are all positive and significant at the
1%-level. High market shares in the previous period increases the attraction of health
level i compared to health level 0 in the current period. This can be interpreted as a
persistence of health level attraction, respectively consumption over time. The parameter
estimates for log(ms0t−1) are all negative and significant at the 1%-level. High attraction
of health level 0 in the previous periods decreases attraction of health level i compared to
health level 0 in the current period.
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Health Level 1 2 3 4 5+
E(Ỹ1)− E(Ỹ0) 0.01 0.01 0.09*** -0.03*** -0.07***
µi0 PRE 1.528 1.014 7.124*** -4.292** 2.113
µi0 POST -3.953 8.264** -15.795*** -14.408** -17.430***
log(price0) PRE 2.610*** 2.186*** 2.116*** 1.854*** 1.524***











log(msit−1) PRE 0.365*** 0.211** 0.234*** 0.297*** 0.467***
log(msit−1) POST 0.459*** 0.227** 0.381*** 0.378*** 0.468***
log(ms0t−1) PRE -0.227*** -0.258** -0.202 -0.561*** -0.323*
log(ms0t−1) POST -0.653*** -0.456*** 0.283* -0.672*** -0.409***
Adj.R2 PRE 0.81 0.87 0.94 0.80 0.86
Adj.R2 POST 0.66 0.88 0.89 0.74 0.60
Table 7: Results of the MSA model for ready meals
*Significant at the 0.1 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, ***Significant at the 0.01 level
With the coefficients for price and the lagged dependent variables, we control for these
influences on health level attraction while analyzing the impact of the GDA label intro-
duction. The estimates for E(Ỹ1)−E(Ỹ0) in Tables 6 and 7 allow us to assess the impact
of the GDA label introduction on the attraction of health level i compared to health level
0. For both food categories, we observe for the unhealthiest health levels (2 and 3 in the
yogurt category and 4 and 5+ in the ready meals category) that their attraction compared
to health level 0 decreases after the GDA label introduction. This can be interpreted as
a health effect of nutrition labeling, where consumers reduce their intake of unhealthy
nutrients by the offering of nutrition information (Teisl et al. 2001). It is important to
emphasize that this effect is small compared to the influence of price and the lagged de-
pendent variables.
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In Tables 6 and 7, we also present the adjusted R2, which measures the proportion of
explained variance by the explanatory variables. In the yogurt category, we observe high
as well as moderate values while all adjusted R2 in the ready meals category are regarded
as high.
Disaggregated Choice Model
We present the results from the estimation of the discrete choice model for the yogurt
as well as for the ready meals category in Tables 8 and 9. For both categories, we have
chosen the healthiest level (health level = 0) as the baseline alternative to be able to
compare the results to the MSA model. Some parameters are estimated across all health
levels (price, discount and loyalty), while the other parameters are estimated health level
specific, as we expect that their values are influenced by the healthiness of a product
(intercept, label, gender, and the interaction effect of label · gender). The health level
specific effects are relative to the baseline alternative (health level = 0). Table 8 shows
the results for the yogurt data, and in Table 9 we present the results for the ready meals
data.
Health Level All 1 2 3
Intercept 0.23* 0.33*** -0.16
label 0.54*** 0.10 0.32
gender 0.22 0.08 -0.24







Table 8: Results of the discrete choice model for yogurt
*Significant at the 0.1 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, ***Significant at the 0.01 level
The marketing-mix variables price and discount reveal significant parameter estimates
with the expected signs for both category estimations. For price, we expected a negative
sign, and for discount, we expected a positive sign. This means that increasing price
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leads to lower choice probability and increasing share of transactions on discount increases
choice probability across all health levels. For yogurt choices, the parameter for the share
of transactions on discount is not significant, but the standard deviation of the random
coefficients is. This can be explained by heterogeneous response to discounts among
consumers in terms of increase or decrease of choice probability. The parameters for loyalty
are positive and significant in both models. The choice probability for a certain health
level increases if consumers have chosen this health level in previous choice situations.
This means that consumers show strong persistence in choice behavior over time. The
standard deviation for the loyalty measure is also significant revealing a heterogeneous
response according to past purchases of individual consumers.
Health All 1 2 3 4 5+
Intercept 0.53*** 0.34*** -1.05*** -1.08*** -1.61***
label -0.19** -0.11 -0.31* -0.09 0.22
gender -0.20 -0.42*** -0.01 -0.03 -0.44**







Table 9: Results of the discrete choice model for ready meals
*Significant at the 0.1 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, ***Significant at the 0.01 level
There are no generalizable results for less healthy levels to be chosen less likely compared
to the healthiest levels after the label introduction. In the yogurt category, only the effect
of label for health level 1 compared to health level 0 is significant. The sign is positive so
that the choice probability for the unhealthier yogurt with health level 1 increases com-
pared to the healthiest yogurt with health level 0 after GDA label introduction. In the
ready meals category, the parameter for the label introduction is negative and significant
for health level 1 compared to level 0, and for health level 3 compared to level 0. The
choice probability for these unhealthier food products decreases after GDA label introduc-
tion. There are no significant effects for the other health levels, so that a generalization
of healthier purchase behavior cannot be confirmed for both food categories after GDA
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label introduction.
It follows from the non-significant parameters for gender that female loyalty card appli-
cants do not choose healthier food products in the yogurt category. In the ready meals
category, the parameters for health level 2 compared to level 0, and for level 5+ com-
pared to level 0, are significant with a negative sign. Female loyalty card applicants are
less likely to choose ready meals with these health levels compared to the healthiest food
products. Generally, healthier purchase behavior in both categories is not observed for
female loyalty card applicants. The parameter for the interaction between label and gen-
der measures the effect of female loyalty card applicants facing the GDA label. Only the
parameter for health level 1 compared to health level 0 in the yogurt category is signif-
icant and negative. Female loyalty card applicants are less likely to choose the slightly
unhealthier yogurt from health level 1 than the yogurt from health level 0 after the label
introduction. In the ready meals category, all parameters for the interaction between label
introduction and gender are not significant. We do not observe a generalizable effect of
the label introduction on the purchase behavior of female customers.
The McFadden-R2 for the discrete choice model for yogurt is 0.435, which can be inter-
preted as high, while the McFadden-R2 of the discrete choice model for ready meals only
reaches a moderate level of 0.115.
In both food categories, we do not observe healthier purchase behavior in terms of choice
probability after the GDA label introduction. The effect is also absent when female cus-
tomers are considered separately. Both categories reveal that price has a large influence
on choice probability. Loyalty shows a very large influence on choice probability which
means that consumers show high persistence in their choice behavior.
2.5 Study 1: Discussion
In our paper, we investigate the effect of introducing a GDA label in two product cate-
gories. We use two modeling approaches, one on an aggregated level and another one on
a disaggregated level. To our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing and comparing
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nutrition label effects at different data aggregation levels. We control for price, trends,
and seasonality in the aggregated model, and for price, promotional activity, consumers
characteristics, and unobserved heterogeneity in the disaggregated model.
In the aggregated model, we observe that the attraction of the unhealthiest food products
compared to the healthiest food products slightly decreases after GDA label introduction
in both food categories in terms of market share. This suggests that the GDA label
introduction led to healthier purchase behavior. In the disaggregated choice model, how-
ever, this relationship is blurred. Although we observe a decrease in choice probability
of some unhealthy alternatives compared to the healthiest option, no generalizable pat-
tern emerges. This means that some unhealthy alternatives (including the unhealthiest
options) were as likely to be chosen after the GDA label introduction. Moreover, we find
partially significant effects for gender, label and their interaction. As before, these results
also cannot be generalized in terms of healthier purchase behavior.
One reason for the more nuanced results in the disaggregated model is that this ap-
proach accounts for observed and unobserved heterogeneity of the customers. Some of
the parameter estimates for gender are significant. Furthermore, the random coefficients,
which account for unobserved heterogeneity, are highly significant. These influences are
not captured in the aggregated model and, thus, can account for the different outcomes.
Furthermore, the disaggregated model accounts for differences between the explanatory
variables. Price for all health levels influences the choice probability, while in the aggre-
gated model only two price covariates are possible for each equation to avoid problems
with multicollinearity. Even though both modeling approaches have a similar interpre-
tation of the parameter estimates for the GDA label introduction, they have different
maximization strategies for their obtainment. Another reason for the difference between
the results of the models is that our disaggregated model accounts for loyalty to a much
greater extent than the aggregated market share model. The lagged dependent variables
show tendencies towards persistence in consumer behavior with significant parameter es-
timates and higher magnitudes than the GDA label effect. The loyalty variable in the
discrete choice model captures this effect on an individual level with further incorporation
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of unobserved heterogeneity in the random coefficients. Product loyalty may actually lead
consumers to avoid package search and therefore not pay attention to the new GDA label
(Jacoby et al. 1977). This strong effect in the discrete choice model can probably mask
minor effects of healthier purchase behavior in terms of choice probability.
One additional finding from our study is that price in both models (and promotional
activity in the discrete choice model) has a large impact on purchase and choice be-
havior. These findings are in line with many previous research studies, which reveal that
marketing-mix variables have a larger influence on food choice than health concerns (Levy
et al. 1985; Ma et al. 2013; Mojduszka et al. 2001). Our findings furthermore support
Chandon and Wansink (2012) who state that price has a high influence on consumers’
energy intake while the effectiveness of nutrition labels is overestimated.
The internal validity of our analysis is considered to be high, as we rely on established
methods analyzing market share and choice data. We control for dynamics in the aggre-
gated model and also rely on a counterfactual approach to assess the impact of the GDA
label introduction on health level attraction. In the disaggregated model, we control for
observed and unobserved heterogeneity as well as dynamics.
We have some limitations in our data set. We were only able to access purchase data on
store brands although these account for more than 50% of the purchases in the categories.
In the estimation of our aggregated market share model, we explicitly model the effect
of price at different health levels. However, price from national brands are not taken
into account, as we do not have access to this information. Non-price related market-
ing decisions such as allocation of shelf space, may of course also influence the market
share or choice probability of an alternative. This information is also not included in our
data. Nevertheless, our models include more explanatory variables compared to similar
previous studies. The results from our analyzes support the current discussion about the
usefulness of nutrition labeling. We have not found a systematic shift toward purchases of
healthier food due to the introduction of GDA labels. We observe a slight decrease in at-
traction for the unhealthier food products compared to the healthiest category. Based on
our results, we agree that GDA labels are not sufficient to substantially change consumer
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behavior towards healthier alternatives. Following studies could concentrate on analyzing
the influence of other FOP label types on healthier purchase behavior in real-life settings.
That being said, there is still the possibility that GDA labels can affect first-time choices.
While most consumers appear to make habitual purchases, consumers who buy yogurt
or ready meals for the first time could be guided by nutrition labels. This possibility
deserves attention in future studies.
2.6 Study 1: Appendix
The Market Share Attraction Model (MSA)
The market share attraction (MSA) model describes the market share of a health level
via the relative attractiveness of that health level in relation to a baseline health level on
the market.
We let Ait denote the sales in kg of health level i at time t. The associated market share




with i = 0, ...I and t = 1, ...T (1)







= µi0 + β1i0log(price0) + β2i0log(pricei)+
β3i0log(ms0t−1) + β4i0log(msit−1) + εit (2)
For each health level i, we estimate one equation. The system of (I − 1) equations can
be estimated by a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR; Zellner 1962). This procedure
allows estimating several regression equations where the error terms εit are assumed to
be correlated across the equations. Capturing the correlation between residuals of the
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different equations enables us to control for common unobserved factors influencing the
dependent variables.





is interpreted as an increase in attraction of health level i
compared to health level 0. Therefore, we expect that the sign for β1i0 is positive, because
the attraction of health level i increases with increasing price of health level 0. The sign
for β2i0 is expected to be negative because if price of the health level i increases this should
lead to a decrease in attraction compared to health level 0. The signs for β3i0 and β4i0
depend on the type of dynamics inherent in the consumer behavior and product category.
For example, if β4i0 is positive, consumers show a persistence in their purchase behavior
across time periods.
The Random Coefficient Multinomial Logit Model (RCL)
The probability Pni of consumer n to choose alternative i among the M alternatives with







β includes the parameters for the effect of the explanatory variables xi from alternative i.
To simplify our model presentation, we subsume all variables in one explanatory variable.
Later on we will present explicitly the equation with all explanatory variables. In the RCL
model, the choice probability Pni for consumer n to choose alternative i can be expressed






j=1 exp(β · xi)
)
f (β) dβ (4)
Pni becomes the weighted average of the standard MNL equation at different values of
β, with the weights given by the mixing distribution f (β). The β coefficients can be
estimated with a Simulated-Maximum-Likelihood procedure (Train 2009, p. 144).
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To take the repeated choices by the consumers into consideration, the Panel-Data-Technique
(Revelt and Train 1998) should be applied. In this case the likelihood for a consumer is
the product of the likelihood for the consumer’s T choice situations.








j=1 exp(β · xi)
)
f (β) dβ (5)
Our discrete choice model with r as the baseline alternative from the M alternatives has
the following specification:
β · xi =
M∑
j=1;j 6=r
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3.1 Study 2: Introduction
Health problems caused by unhealthy food intake are increasing (WHO 2012). Reduc-
tion of nutrition-related health problems is a major challenge of the 21st century because
millions of adults die each year as a result of being overweight or obese (Ng et al. 2014).
Against this background, nutrition labeling is regarded as a potential instrument to in-
duce necessary dietary changes and to influence consumption behavior (WHO 2012).
Back-of-pack nutrition information is already mandatory for prepackaged food in many
developed countries (Kasapila and Shaarani 2014). Governments aim to induce a health
effect, meaning that consumers reduce their intake of unhealthy nutrients by the offering
of health-related information (Teisl et al. 2001). This would lead to less nutrition-related
health problems and therefore less health costs. In addition, both food manufactur-
ers and retailers have voluntarily implemented front-of-pack nutrition labeling as part
of their marketing strategy (van Kleef and Dagevos 2015). From a shopper marketing
perspective, this aims to influence the customer along and beyond the act of purchasing
(Newman et al. 2014; Shankar et al. 2011). Retailers try to create value for customers
and to obtain their store loyalty by voluntary nutrition labeling. The latter outcome has
not yet been explored scientifically in a real-life setting, so that the decision to implement
voluntary nutrition labeling may have been based on an erroneous assumption.
Nutrition labeling is defined as “an attempt to provide consumers, at the point of pur-
chase, with information about nutrition content of individual food products, in order to
enable consumers to choose nutritionally appropriate food” (Grunert and Wills 2007, p.
385). A large amount of research has analyzed front-of-pack nutrition labeling and how
consumers respond to different labeling schemes (for recent reviews, see Hersey et al.
2013; van Kleef and Dagevos 2015; vant Riet 2012). Consumers have a positive attitude
towards nutrition information on food packages and appear able and willing to choose
healthier options using any labeling scheme (Storcksdieck and Wills 2012). The provision
of nutrition information increases consumers’ awareness of health benefits achieved by
consumption of specific foods (Newman et al. 2014). Research using real purchase data is
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still short of evidence about the success of nutrition labels to promote healthier purchase
behavior. Hence, many authors call for more research about consumers’ response to nu-
trition labeling with real purchase data, in particular for research analyzing the influence
of front-of-pack labels (e.g., Andrews et al. 2014; Hersey et al. 2013; Lachat and Tseng
2013).
Despite the fact that research is still short of evidence about the effectiveness of front-of-
pack nutrition labels in real-life settings (or perhaps for this reason), numerous retailers
have voluntarily introduced such labeling schemes (van Kleef and Dagevos 2015). Theoret-
ical frameworks deriving the benefits of voluntary nutrition labeling for retailers have been
established. For example, according to signaling theory, if the nutritional composition of
a food product is considered with product quality only firms with lower quality would
refuse to voluntarily reveal their product characteristics (Mojduszka and Caswell 2000).
This enables retailers to increase perceived product quality by voluntary front-of-pack nu-
trition labeling. Attribution theory provides another explanation how voluntary nutrition
labeling affects consumer’s perceptions. The label introduction may be attributed to the
retailer’s concern for the customers and result in improved attitudes towards the retailer
and increased patronage intentions (Newman et al. 2014). Studies have shown that cus-
tomer goodwill (Russo et al. 1986) and store image (Achabal et al. 1987) increase due to
labeling. While the current state of research claims that retailers benefit from voluntary
nutrition labeling through improved attitudes, no research has investigated whether re-
tailers benefit with improved revenue-concerned metrics. Attitudes alone are often poor
predictors of marketplace behavior (Ajzen 2001; Vermeir and Verbeke 2006) and, hence,
research with observed behavior is deemed necessary to gain further insights into retailer
benefits from voluntary nutrition labeling (Newman et al. 2014).
Our study aims to fill this research gap by comparing revenues before and after nutri-
tion labeling and by measuring changes in the number of loyalty card applications. To
our knowledge, no previous study has examined how voluntary nutrition labeling affects
retailers’ benefits analyzing real purchase data. We therefore contribute to the growing
literature on how retailers benefit from voluntary nutrition labeling. Moreover, our results
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will guide retailers in their decision to implement front-of-pack labeling as part of their
marketing strategy.
We make a further contribution by providing insights for the impact of voluntary front-
of-pack nutrition labeling on consumers’ real purchase behavior. We compare the amount
of sugar and fat purchased in food products before and after nutrition labeling. These
measures are more likely to determine healthier purchase behavior than changes in sales
or market share as examined in previous research from this area. Our results will support
policy makers and retailers when considering the front-of-pack labeling scheme from our
study and shed light on its effectiveness in promoting healthier purchase behavior.
The supermarket purchase data for our study is provided by a major retailer located in the
UK. The retailer voluntarily introduced a front-of-pack Guideline Daily Amount (GDA)
nutrition facts label on all of its own store brands in 2007 (see Figure 2, left panel). It
displays the amount of calories (in kcal) as well as sugar, fat, saturated fat, and salt (in
grams) per serving. These are supplemented with the percentage of recommended daily
amount of the displayed nutrition values consumed per serving. This percentage is calcu-
lated for an adult requiring 2,000 calories per day. Prior to the introduction of the GDA
label on the front of the food package, a mandatory back-of-pack Nutrition Information
(NI) panel existed and remains available (see Figure 2, right panel). The NI panel displays
the food energy content in kJ and kcal, along with the same nutrition values as the GDA
label, as well as others such as protein or fiber. These values are presented in grams per
100 grams and are not supplemented with a percentage of recommended daily amount.
Figure 2: GDA label (left) / NI panel (right)
The dataset contains purchase transactions two years before and after the label introduc-
tion for three food categories: biscuits, breakfast cereals, and soft drinks. To analyze the
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label effect, we apply a seemingly unrelated regression model that accounts for trends and
seasonality as well as explanatory variables to capture time-dependence and marketing-
mix effects.
The remainder of the paper starts with a discussion of existing literature on consumers’
response and retailers’ benefits due to voluntary front-of-pack nutrition labeling. We in-
troduce the dataset provided for the study and describe the data processing steps. We
explain our model specification and estimation procedure. Afterwards, we describe our
results followed by a summary and discussion of these results in the conclusion. Finally,
we conclude with implications for retailers as well as opportunities for future research.
3.2 Study 2: Conceptual Background
Consumer Response to Nutrition Labeling
As stated by previous research, consumers are more concerned with avoiding unhealthy
nutrition content such as sugar and fat rather than ingesting healthy nutrients such as
vitamins or fiber (Balasubramanian and Cole 2002; Heimbach 1981). In a study by Prior
et al. (2011), 84% of the respondents from the UK knew that they should be eating the
smallest amount of foods high in sugar or fat. Nutrition labels disclose nutrition content
and aim to increase consumers’ attention towards it (Russo et al. 1986). With the GDA
label, the disclosed nutrition values are limited to unhealthy nutrition content. Posting the
label on the front of the package draws consumers’ attention more effectively. Compared
to the NI panel, consumers have to evaluate less information which is easier accessible
and more relevant due to the solely disclosure of unhealthy nutrients.
The GDA label also increases nutrition knowledge compared to the NI panel by disclosing
the percentage of recommended daily amount of nutrition content consumed per serving.
From the perspective of reference point theory, such information is regarded essential be-
cause numerical nutrition content will only be meaningfully interpreted with comparison
to other information (van Herpen et al. 2014; Visschers and Siegrist 2009; Viswanathan
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1994). As nutrition labels can transform food products concerning their nutritional prop-
erties from credence-goods to search-goods (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996), disclosing the
recommended daily amount of unhealthy nutrition content becomes part of the food choice
decision. In this context, three types of costs are mentioned by Russo et al. (1986) when
choosing food products based on nutrition information:
(i) Collection cost is the time and effort required to collect the nutritional information,
(ii) computation costs to evaluate the collected information and (iii) comprehension costs
depending on consumers nutrition knowledge. Type (i) and (ii) are reduced by the front-
of-pack GDA label compared to the back-of-pack NI panel. Collection costs decrease
because customers face the nutrition information on the front of the food package making
it conceivably unnecessary to even pick up the item under consideration. The smaller
number of relevant unhealthy nutrition values presented in a user-friendly label format
with larger font furthermore reduces collection costs. Computation costs to evaluate the
nutritional quality is reduced by disclosing the percentage of recommended daily amount
so that customer can get rid of doing the math by them self. Comprehension costs are not
necessarily decreased because the label does not explicitly communicate that the disclosed
nutrition values are unhealthy, neither that the total daily amount should be 100%. The
GDA label can conceivably induce a demand for learning if consumers lack the knowledge
to process the disclosed information.
In summary, the GDA label has potential in reducing search and processing costs, which
simplifies the decision process for consumers when choosing among prepackaged foods
with the goal to avoid unhealthy nutrition content (Kiesel et al. 2011). Reducing the
intake of unhealthy nutrients by the offering of health-related information is called the
health effect (Teisl et al. 2001). A potential threat to the health effect is that consumers
consider changes in behavior as costs. Unhealthy food attributes such as sugar and fat are
associated with taste and pleasure by consumers (Belei et al. 2012; Raghunathan et al.
2006). If this applies, the intake of unhealthy nutrients will not necessarily decrease af-
ter the GDA label introduction. Research has shown that consumers prefer taste over
nutrition content when making their food choice decision (Chandon and Wansink 2012;
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Grunert et al. 2010; Mojduszka et al. 2001). According to Dhar and Simonson (1999),
switching from tasty and unhealthy food to less tasty but healthy food results in a loss in
taste and a gain in health. The authors furthermore contend that switching to healthier
food with losses in taste seems less attractive because losses weigh more than gains. As
a consequence, consumers’ trade-off considerations between taste and health can lead to
different results than the health effect would suggest.
From this background, the GDA label will only induce healthier purchase behavior for a
subset of customers. As described by Burton and Kees (2012), the subset of consumers
affected by nutrition labeling must have specific characteristics. First, consumers must
recognize the label. Then they must be motivated and able to process the information and
also able to use this information for a change in behavior. The disclosed information must
increase nutrition knowledge, induce a desire for dietary change and turn any trade-off
considerations in favor of health. Consumers who fulfill these characteristics will reduce
their purchase volume of unhealthy nutrients after the GDA label introduction.
Retailer Benefits of Voluntary Nutrition Labeling
Attitudes towards retailers as well as perceptions and behaviorial intentions of customers
may be influenced by voluntary nutrition labeling. For example, Russo et al. (1986) found
an increase in customer goodwill towards the retailer as a result of nutrition labeling
and Achabal et al. (1987) revealed an improvement in store image. Voluntary nutrition
labeling is part of retailers’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy. Attribution
theory suggests that consumers’ positive experience with front-of-pack nutrition labeling
will be attributed to the retailer. Consumers’ perception of a retailer that is concerned
about its customers well-being can lead to more positive attitudes and increase patronage
intentions (Newman et al. 2014). Positive CSR beliefs by customers are associated with
greater purchase likelihood and long-term loyalty, especially when the CSR strategy is
integrated into the firm’s core business (Du et al. 2007). We assume that this holds for
food retailers implementing voluntary nutrition labeling on their own store brands.
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According to Grossman’s (1981) signaling theory, the voluntary introduction of nutrition
labels can increase the perceived product quality. If the nutritional composition of a food
product is considered with product quality only firms with lower quality would refuse
to voluntarily reveal their nutrition values (Mojduszka and Caswell 2000). This leads
to the possibility for retailers to enhance the perceived product quality, especially with
voluntary front-of-pack labeling implemented for the own store brands which are compared
to national brands in the same store. Higher perceived quality for store brands increases
their share of sales (Sethuraman and Gielens 2014; Steenkamp and Geyskens 2014) and
increases store loyalty intentions (Sirohi et al. 1998).
In summary, retailers aim to benefit by voluntary nutrition labeling on their store brands.
Purchase volume and share of sales of store brands can increase if the perceived product
quality of customers increases. Improvement of customers attitudes towards the retailer
should result in increased store loyalty.
3.3 Study 2: Purchase Data
The purchase data is provided by a major retailer located in the UK. It contains pur-
chase transactions of the retailer’s store brands from 2,360 different supermarket branches
during a time-span of four years (2005-2008). The share of store brands available in the
retailer’s supermarkets exceeds 50% and generates almost the same proportion of total
sales. The retailer’s product variety covers low-priced products (34% of its store brand
volume), standard quality products (61%) and high quality products (5%). The purchase
transactions are scanner data from the loyalty card members from the food categories bis-
cuits, breakfast cereals and soft drinks. We assume that purchase behavior for sweet and
rather unhealthy food products has a greater likelihood to be affected by the disclosure
of unhealthy nutrition values.
Each purchase transaction provides the shopping date as week number, the Unique Prod-
uct Code (UPC) of the purchased product, the quantity purchased, the unit price, and a
0/1-dummy if the product was purchased with discount. We link each UPC in the pur-
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chase transactions with the product size (in grams) and nutrition content of the specific
product. The information for each UPC is also provided by the retailer. This offers the
possibility to calculate the purchased total volume in grams as well as the total amount
of sugar and fat (in grams) purchased in the food products for each purchase transac-
tion. Changes in the nutritional composition of the food products are not present in the
time-span of our study. We multiply unit price with the purchased quantity to obtain the
retailer’s revenues.
Each food category has different numbers of UPC: biscuits with 278, breakfast cereals with
55, and soft drinks with 198 alternatives. This enables the customers to choose among a
broad range of products with respect to the level of nutrition values. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of the sugar and fat values per 100 grams for the three food categories. The
plots demonstrate the variety of different nutrition amounts per 100 grams between and
within the food categories.
We have two additional variables on a weekly basis for our analysis. For each week,
we have information about the number of loyalty card members who produced the total
amount of purchase transactions in the three food categories. We also have the total
number of applications for the retailer’s loyalty card per week. We aggregate the vari-
ables for the analysis into four-week periods. This produces 13 periods per year and 52
periods in total. We add the last four-week period in 2004 as initial period which results
into T = 53 time periods. This aggregation helps to capture the seasonal characteris-
tics of our variables in combination with a sufficient number of periods for parameter
estimation. For each food category and period, we determine the total volume in grams
and the sum of sugar and fat in grams purchased in the food products (tvolume, tsugar,
tfat) as well as the total revenues (trevenue). We summarize the number of loyalty card
members who produce the purchase transactions into the total number of customers per
food category and period (tcustomer). The variables for volume, sugar and fat assess
consumers’ purchase behavior in terms of healthiness. Revenues evaluate the outcome
for the retailer by possible changes in expenditure by the customers. The total of the
dependent variables can be influenced by either changes in the number of customers or
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Figure 3: Histogram: Sugar and fat content
by changes in the behavior of customers. Therefore, we use the number of customers
(tcustomer) purchasing in the food categories to distinguish between these two effects on
tvolume, tsugar, tfat and trevenue. We divide the total amounts of volume, sugar, fat
and revenue by tcustomer. This results into additional dependent variables: the mean
volume (cvolume), the mean sum of sugar and fat (csugar, cfat) and the mean revenues
(crevenue) per customer. With our dependent variables, we are able to cover different
response patterns of the customers who induce the health effect as a result of the nutri-
tion disclosure. If the customers start choosing healthier alternatives from the same food
category, we expect the amount of sugar and fat to decrease, while the purchased volume
remains unchanged. If sugar, fat and volume decreases, customers induce their reduction
of unhealthy nutrients by reducing their purchased volume or even by quitting to pur-
chase products from the unhealthy food category. The effect on the retailer’s revenues
will depend on the revealed response behavior of the customers.
For each time period, we also calculate the total number of loyalty card applications
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(card). This information is used as a proxy for customers store loyalty intentions which
ideally leads to additional future revenues for the retailer. Customers with the intention to
continue shopping and to increase purchases would benefit financially from the retailer’s
loyalty card program. As found by Meyer-Waarden (2007), customers who participate in
loyalty programs have longer lifetimes and increased expenditure.
The explanatory variables in each food category and period are the mean price per kg
in pennies (price) and the share of transactions with discount (promo). Previous stud-
ies emphasize the importance of considering marketing-mix variables due to their great
influence on food choice (Levy et al. 1985; Ma et al. 2013; Mojduszka et al. 2001). We
also calculate general price and promotion levels without food category separation for the
model with card as dependent variable. We provide plots of our variables over time in
Figures 4 and 5. We standardize our variables to zero mean and unity variance to compare
the course for the same variables from the different food categories in one plot. Figures
4 and 5 reveal trends and seasonal patterns which will be considered in our modeling
approach.
The introduction date of the GDA label is stated as “end of 2006.” Hence, we assume
that the label effect occurs in the years 2007 and 2008. We operationalize this by a 0/1
































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Line plots: csugar, cfat, cvolume, crevenue, tcustomer, card
51
3.4 Study 2: Modeling Approach
Model Specification
For each dependent variable, we build a model to examine the effect of the label intro-
duction. We analyze each dependent variable for each food category (except for card) to
account for category heterogeneity. We control for the marketing-mix effects of price and
promo. We include dynamic components by a lagged dependent variable (Yi(t−1)) because
of the time-series dimension of our data. The effect of label on the dependent variable Y
is of interest to examine the effect of the GDA label. The model for food category i at
time t with error ε has the form:
Yit = βi0 + βi1labelt + βi2priceit + βi3promoit+
βi4Yi(t−1) + εit (7)
We do not include instrumental variables (IV) in our model specification as the marketing-
mix variables price and promo capture general levels of price and promotional activity
for each food category on a time-series dimension. In such cases, the need for IV methods
becomes less strong (Rossi 2014). Without IV, we account for the structural quantity of
general marketing-mix activity across all of the retailer supermarkets and avoid biased
parameter estimates by weak or invalid instruments.
We estimate our models as a system of equations with the three food categories and their
specific set of dependent and explanatory variables. We apply the seemingly unrelated
regression model (SUR; Zellner 1962) for the M equations to capture common unobserved
factors that influence the dependent variables. For M = 1, the SUR model becomes a
univariate regression model. Our SUR model for each dependent variable and the system
of M = 3 equations (one for each food category i) over the time-span T with X as
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explanatory variables has the form:
Yi = Xiβi + εi, (8)
(ε1t, ε2t, ε3t)
′ ∼ N(0,Σ), with t = 1, ..., T
For ease of presentation we combine the M = 3 equations into one equation:
Y = Xβ + ε ε ∼ N(0,Σ⊗ IT ) (9)
with






β = (β1, β2, β3), ε = (ε1, ε2, ε3)
Differencing
It is necessary to ensure that the expected value and variance of Yit are independent over
time. This enables to control for trends and seasonality in Yit when assessing the impact
of the label introduction. It also provides an unbiased β-effect for the lagged dependent
variable Yi(t−1). We eliminate trends and seasonality in Yit by differencing the original
values. We omit the index i for the different food categories to simplify the presentation
of the equations. To eliminate a trend, we difference Yt at lag 1, which leads to the
detrended variable ∆1Yt′ .
∆1Yt′ = Yt − Yt−1 (10)
with t = 1, ..., T and t′ = 1, ..., (T − 1)
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To account for seasonality, we difference ∆1Yt′ at lag 13 which corresponds to the length
of the seasonal cycle with 13 periods per year:
∆13∆1Yt∗ = ∆1Yt′ −∆1Yt′−13 (11)
with t∗ = 1, .., (T − 1)− 13
We apply hypothesis testing to verify that ∆13∆1Yt∗ does not have a trend (KPSS-test
by Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) or a seasonal pattern (CH-test by Canova and Hansen 1995).
We difference the explanatory variables in the same way as their corresponding dependent
variable.
Parameter Estimation
We estimate the parameters for the SUR model of the detrended variables ∆13∆1Y and
∆13∆1X with a Bayesian MCMC approach. This helps to overcome asymptotic properties
of classical SUR estimates due to our reduced number of data points after differencing
(T ∗ = (T − 1) − 13). The first step is to specify conjugate prior distributions for the
parameters β and Σ from equation (9). We apply the normal prior for β ∼ N(β̄, A−1)
and the Inverted Wishart prior for Σ ∼ IW (υ0, V0). The posterior distribution for the
parameters of the SUR model are simulated by Gibbs sampling as described by Rossi et al.
(2005, p. 65). Given Σ, equation (9) is transformed into a system with uncorrelated errors
by the root of the cross-equation covariance matrix Σ = U ′U . Due to (U−1)′ΣU−1 = I,
multiplying both sides of equation (9) with (U−1)′ ⊗ I leads to the transformed system
with uncorrelated errors which holds:
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Ỹ = X̃β + ε̃ (12)
with
Ỹ = (U−1)′ ⊗ IT ∗)∆13∆1Y
X̃ = (U−1)′ ⊗ IT ∗)∆13∆1X,
var(ε̃) = E[(U−1)′ ⊗ IT ∗)εε′(U−1)′ ⊗ IT ∗)]
The posterior distribution of β given Σ becomes:
β|Σ, Y,X ∼ N
(
β̃, (X̃ ′X̃ + A)−1
)
(13)
with β̃ = (X̃ ′X̃ + A)−1(X̃ ′Ỹ + Aβ̄)
The posterior distribution of Σ given β becomes:
Σ|β, Y,X ∼ IW (M + T ∗, S +M + T ∗) (14)
with S = E ′E, E = (ε1, ε2, ε3)
After specifying the prior values for β̄ and A, we start the Gibbs sampler with (β1,Σ1)
and draw β2|Σ1 from equation (13) and Σ2|β2 from equation (14). We use OLS residuals
from the untransformed equation (9) to obtain Σ1. The sampling procedure is repeated
D times to obtain D values for the posterior distribution of β and Σ. We compute the
mean of the posterior distribution (E(β)) as the β-effects in equation (7). Our measure
of significance for the β-effects is the share of β-draws with the opposite algebraic sign
as the mean of the posterior distribution (posterior probability P (β≷0), see Fong et al.
2012; Rossi et al. 1996).
Model Diagnostics
To evaluate the model fit and check for model assumptions we calculate different diag-
nostic measures. The coefficient of determination (R2) gives the proportion of variance of
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the dependent variable explained by the explanatory variables. Furthermore, we calculate
the Variance Influence Factor (VIF) to check for multicollinearity, the p-value of the stu-
dentized Breusch-Pagan test by Koenker (1981) (sBP ) to test for homoscedasticity and
the Breusch-Godfrey (Breusch 1978) test (BGAR(3)) to ensure the absence of serial auto-
correlation of order up to three. We obtain the fitted values and residuals by predicting
Y with E(β).
3.5 Study 2: Results
Differencing
We detrend all dependent variables at lag 1 to eliminate the linear trends exposed in
Figures 4 and 5. The null hypothesis of the KPSS-test (“no trend”) is not rejected for all
dependent variables after differencing at lag 1. We perform seasonal differencing at lag
13 for all dependent variables, except card, to account for the seasonal patterns visible
in Figures 4 and 5. The null hypothesis of the CH-test (“no seasonal pattern”) is not
rejected after differencing at lag 13. The dependent variable card passes the CH-test
without seasonal differencing. The differencing procedure leads to a reduced number of
data points for each model ((53− 1)− 13 = 39 and 53− 1 = 52 for the model with card).
We difference the explanatory variables in the same way as their corresponding depen-
dent variable. This allows us to interpret the parameter estimates for price, promo and
Yi(t−1) as slope coefficients and the parameter estimate for label as level change in the
dependent variable due to the GDA label introduction. After differencing, we standardize
all variables to zero mean and unity variance to enable the comparison of the magnitude
of the parameter estimates. Both differencing and standardization eliminates the effect
of the intercept βi0.
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Parameter Estimation
For the Bayesian parameter estimation, we choose different priors for β̄ and A to ensure
independence from this specification for the posterior distribution. For β̄, we specify the
diffuse prior with all values equal 0 as well as OLS estimates and the values of 1 and -1
in line with our expected outcome (e.g. -1 for price according to the “law of demand”).
For the precision matrix A, we also vary the priors from 0.001 to 1 to control for flat and
peaked prior distributions. All specifications yield in very similar results. We present the
parameter estimates from the diffuse prior specification of β̄ = 0 and the precision matrix
A as 0.01I. We use D = 10, 000 draws to simulate the posterior distribution and calculate
E(β) with the 9,000 draws after the burn-in period of 1,000 draws. All MCMC chains
meet convergence within the burn-in period of 1,000 draws. Summarizing the posterior
distribution with the high number of 9,000 remaining draws ensures accuracy of P (β≷0).
Purchase Data
We present E(β) and P (β≷0) for the purchase data models in Tables 10 to 14 (see Ap-
pendix). We highlight E(β) in bold if P (β≷0)≤.10. This threshold supports a significant
effect of the explanatory variable. We consider an effect as a tendency to influence the
dependent variable if P (β≷0)<.20 and present these parameter estimates underlined. In
Tables 10 to 14, we also present the model diagnostics. The values for max(VIF) for all
explanatory variables from each equation do not show any multicollinearity. We do not
reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (sBP ) for any of the equations due to high
p-values. We also do not reject the null of the Breusch-Godfrey-test BGAR(3) (“no serial
autocorrelation up to order three”) for any of the 26 equations, except for one (Table 13,
breakfast cereals, crevenue). There are two equations where we remove remaining auto-
correlation by an additional lagged dependent variable (see Tables 11 and 12, breakfast
cereals, cfat and crevenue). This attempt does not support the null hypothesis of BGAR(3)
for the equation in the breakfast cereals category with crevenue as dependent variable.
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We do not draw implications from this equation because the parameter estimates can be
biased by serial autocorrelation. We do not observe endogeneity bias for our equations in
terms of correlation between explanatory variables and residuals (Cov(εit, Xit) = 0). Al-
most all E(β) for the lagged dependent variables have a negative sign and most estimates
show significant effects at the level P (β ≷ 0)≤.10. We do not describe these estimates
in detail because they are rather directed towards capturing time-dependency than for
interpretation purposes.
In Tables 10 and 11, we present E(β) for the food energy amounts in total and the mean
amount per customer. For the amount of sugar the marketing-mix variables price and
promo reveal a large impact on total and per customer purchase behavior in our models.
E(β) for price has a negative sign and E(β) for promo has a positive sign. We conclude
that the volume of sugar in total and per customer increases with lower price levels and
with increased promotional activity. None of the estimates for label are significant at the
level P (β≷0)≤.10. In the soft drinks category, we observe for the total amount of sugar
(tsugar) and per customer (csugar) a tendency for decreased sugar volume after the GDA
label introduction. The explanatory variables do not show a generalizable impact on the
amount of fat in total (tfat) and per customer (cfat). We observe an impact of price on the
mean amount of fat per customer in the biscuits category, and otherwise does promo affect
fat volume significantly in both food categories. Models for the soft drinks category with
fat volume as dependent variable are not useful because these products do not contain
any mentionable amounts of fat (see Figure 3). The GDA label introduction significantly
increases the mean amount of fat per customer in the breakfast cereals category.
In Table 12, we present E(β) for the volume in grams in total (tvolume) and per customer
(cvolume). E(β) for price (promo) is negative (positive) for all models, which is accord-
ing to the “law of demand.” These estimates are significant at the level P (β ≷ 0)≤.10
for almost all models, thereby controlling for the marketing-mix effects when interpreting
the influence of the GDA label introduction. All E(β) for label are negative, but none is
significant. Only the models in the soft drinks category and the total volume (tvolume)
in the breakfast cereals category show tendencies of reduced volume after the GDA label
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introduction.
In Table 13, we present the results for revenues in total (trevenue) and per customer
(crevenue). For the marketing-mix variables price and promo, we observe the expected
outcome which are significant at the level P (β ≷ 0)≤.10 for all models except price in
the soft drinks category with total revenues (P (β≷ 0) = .49) and promo in the biscuits
category with revenues per customer (P (β≷0) = .14). Increasing price and promotional
activity increases revenues for the retailer in our models. The effect of label is negative
for all models. Both models in the soft drinks category have significant effects for label.
We observe that revenues in total and per customer decrease after the GDA label intro-
duction. The models with revenues per customer in the biscuits category and with total
revenue in the breakfast cereals category show tendencies towards decreased revenues af-
ter GDA label introduction.
We present the results for the total number of customers (tcustomer) in Table 14. In our
models, the number of customers purchasing in the food categories is highly influenced by
promotional activity due to the positive and significant estimates for promo. The effect
of price is only significant in the soft drinks category and shows a tendency to influence
the number of customers in the breakfast cereals category. The estimates for label are
negative in all three food category. E(β) for the effect of label is significant in the break-
fast cereals category at the level P (β ≷ 0)≤.10 and shows tendencies for the other two
food categories. In our models, the number of customers who purchase the food products
appears to decrease after the GDA label introduction.
We present E(β) for the model with the number of loyalty card applications (card) as
dependent variable in Table 14. We recognize that the number of loyalty card applications
is significantly increased when the general price level is low due to the negative sign of
E(β) and P (β≷0)≤.10. We do not observe that the GDA label introduction does affect
the number of loyalty card applications.
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Annual Report Data
The purchase data contains only information about the store brands from the three food
categories. From this background, we also extract the revenues from the retailer’s financial
statements of 2005 to 2008. This enables the comparison to the overall performance of
the retailer to any changes in store brand purchases. The fiscal year of the retailer is
shifted by less than 10 weeks from the year ascribed in the purchase data. We consider
the overlap between the annual time periods as sufficient for our comparison. Figure 6
shows the total revenues from the annual report for the fiscal years 2005 to 2008. To
ensure anonymity of the retailer, we standardize the total revenues. The overall price
measure for the model with card as dependent variable is hereby summarized for the four
periods to control for a general price level.
We estimate a model with total revenues from the annual report as dependent variable
and the two explanatory variables label and price aggregated to the four time periods (see
Figure 6). After differencing at lag 1, we obtain the parameter estimates with D = 1, 000.
We use 100 draws as burn-in period and calculate E(β) and P (β ≷ 0) with the 900
remaining draws. The results for E(β) (P (β≷ 0)) are .122 (.42) for label and .766 (.15)
for price. We do not observe a significant effect of the GDA label introduction on the
overall performance. The general price level only reveals a tendency that increased price
level leads to increased total revenues. This outcome is helpful to relate the results from
the purchase data. Changes in the store brand purchases in our data are not connected
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Figure 6: Line plot: Total revenue from annual report
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3.6 Study 2: Conclusions
Summary and Discussion
Our study reveals minor effects towards healthier purchase behavior after GDA label in-
troduction. This finding is in line with our expectation that the front-of-pack nutrition
labeling will only induce healthier purchase behavior for a subset of customers. We do not
observe any benefits for the retailer in terms of revenues or an increase in store loyalty
intention after GDA label introduction. This outcome contradicts our expectations of
retailer benefits due to voluntary front-of-pack nutrition labeling.
In our study, the amount of sugar in total and per customer tends to decrease after the
GDA label introduction only in the soft drinks category. We observe a tendency that less
customers purchase soft drinks and that the remaining customers furthermore tend to
purchase a reduced volume from this food category. A possible explanation for this slight
health effect is that the nutrition content in the soft drinks category is evaluated with less
processing costs because it only contains sugar as unhealthy nutrient while biscuits and
breakfast cereals also contain fat. Ma et al. (2013) report that sugar reduction can be
obtained when low-sugar alternatives are available for consumers with a desire of dietary
change. We do not observe that customers maintain their purchase volume and switch to
soft drinks with lower sugar content, even though this food category provides a high num-
ber of such alternatives in our dataset. The slight reduction in sugar and volume comes
at the expense of the retailer. Our models reveal that revenues in total and per customer
decrease significantly after the GDA label introduction in the soft drinks category. If we
relate this finding to the rather unaffected overall performance of the retailer, the GDA
label introduction did more harm than good for the retailer in this food category. Only
cross-category effects, like an increase in healthier food categories after the GDA label
introduction, can possibly compensate the loss in the soft drinks category. Due to data
limitations we can not control for these effects.
We find that the amount of fat per customer increases significantly in the breakfast ce-
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reals category after the GDA label introduction. On the other hand, we observe that
the number of customers purchasing breakfast cereals declines after GDA label introduc-
tion and that the total volume tends to decrease. This leads us to the conclusion that
less customers purchase breakfast cereals and that the remaining customers reveal un-
healthier purchase behavior after GDA label introduction. Due to the fact that the mean
volume per customer does not increase in our models, we conclude that the remaining
customers choose breakfast cereals with higher fat content after the GDA label intro-
duction. An increase in unhealthy nutrition content can be attributed to customers who
make trade-off consideration when faced with the GDA label. For example, customers
can seek to maximize taste, as discussed in our conceptual background, or increase the
ratio of nutrients-for-money rather than to choose healthier options (Briers and Laporte
2013).
Another explanation for increased nutrition purchases can be a positive disconfirmation
of consumers’ expectations. Findings from Burton et al. (2009) suggest that consumers’
response to nutrition information is driven by the relationship between expected and ac-
tual nutrition levels rather than by the information itself. Confronted with the percentage
of GDA by the new labeling format, consumers’ expectation regarding the recommended
daily amount can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Positive disconfirmation can lead to
healthier perception of food products and increase energy intake. If this applies, the re-
sults in the breakfast cereals category would be attributed to a positive disconfirmation
of consumers’ expectations regarding the amount of fat in breakfast cereals. However,
this is in contrast to our observation that the number of customers purchasing breakfast
cereals decreases after GDA label introduction. We can only assume a gap between the
expectations of different customers regarding the fat amount in breakfast cereals. For the
retailer, the tendency of decreased total volume after GDA label introduction leads to a
tendency of loss in total revenue in our study.
In the biscuits category, we do not observe any significant changes in purchase behavior
after the GDA label introduction. We observe the minor health effects in the rather util-
itarian food categories breakfast cereals and soft drinks. If we assume that consumers
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perceive food products from the biscuits category as hedonic food items, the absence of
a health effect in this food category can be explained by customers justification process
of hedonic goods (Okada 2005). Another reason for a missing health effect in the biscuits
category can be that consumers’ expectations regarding the healthiness in this food cate-
gory were confirmed by the GDA label. A confirmation of expected and actual nutrition
information will not induce a change in consumer behavior (Burton et al. 2009).
Previous research suggests a positive impact of voluntary nutrition labeling on store loy-
alty or patronage intentions (Du et al. 2007; Newman et al. 2014; Sirohi et al. 1998). Our
model with number of loyalty card applications as dependent variable does not exhibit
any changes after the GDA label introduction. Customers with the intention to continue
shopping and to increase purchases would benefit from the retailer’s loyalty card.
In summary, we observe minor healthier purchase behavior but no additional benefits for
the retailer due to voluntary front-of-pack nutrition labeling. When we observe healthier
purchase behavior after the GDA label introduction, it appears to be caused by reduced
volume and therefore less revenue. We consider the subset of customers who seem ready
to bear the costs of the health effect to be small in our study. Our results support
Chandon and Wansink (2012), who state that price is among the strongest marketing
strategies influencing energy intake, while the effectiveness of nutrition information is
overestimated. Our study suggests that health benefits for customers can come at a cost
for retailers without that customers compensate these losses by increased store loyalty.
In addition, we observe that a decrease in price level increases the story loyalty intention
of the customers.
Implications for Retailers
While in theory, retailers benefit from voluntary nutrition labeling, our study did not re-
veal this for revenues or the number of loyalty card applications. This can be explained by
the well known attitude-behavior gap (Ajzen 2001). Positive attitudes towards nutrition
labeling, which will be attributed to the retailer, may suggest a specific behavior when
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considered in isolation. This does not have to apply in a real-life purchase decision, where
consumers tend to incorporate more complex motivations (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006).
We do not observe a decrease in total revenues from the annual report data after the GDA
label introduction. This means that losses which we observe for the sweet food products
seem to be compensated in other food categories. If retailers consider to implement nutri-
tion labels, cross-category compensation by customers, who decide to reduce their intake
of unhealthy nutrients, must be taken into account. This helps to prevent that poten-
tial losses in unhealthy food categories affect the overall performance. Those who choose
not to provide voluntary nutrition labeling should keep in mind that the prevalence of
front-of-pack nutrition labeling systems is increasing. While, from our results, retailers
do not enhance benefits from the label introduction, consumers could regard voluntary
front-of-pack nutrition labeling as a hygiene factor for store and product choice. It follows
that voluntary nutrition labeling can become a need for retailers to maintain customer
relationships rather than a marketing strategy to improve overall performance.
Implications for Future Research
We recommend additional research to investigate the impact of voluntary nutrition la-
beling on the outcome of retailers and food manufacturers. Future research should test
different labeling schemes, ideally with quasi-experimental field studies as already claimed
by Newman et al. (2014). Of utmost interest, would be to investigate if consumers al-
ready regard voluntary front-of-pack nutrition labeling as a hygiene factor in the choice
of their food retailer. We furthermore recommend to incorporate a broader range of
categories regarding healthiness to investigate possible cross-category effects induced by
shifts in purchase behavior. Individual household panel data with complete food retailing
information would support capturing these effects. Future research must gain insights
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R2 .279 .226 .310 .424 .455 .620
max(VIF) 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0
sBP .215 .395 .119 .343 .976 .770
BGAR(3) .629 .573 .843 .921 .596 .161
Table 10: Parameter estimates and diagnostics for tsugar and csugar
(E(β) with P (β≷0) in parenthesis below;
E(β) in bold if P (β≷0)≤.10 and underlined if <.20)
Biscuits Breakfast cereals



































R2 .180 .238 .151 .319
max(VIF) 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.6
sBP .431 .724 .615 .926
BGAR(3) .642 .561 .444 .189
Table 11: Parameter estimates and diagnostics for tfat and cfat
(E(β) with P (β≷0) in parenthesis below;
E(β) in bold if P (β≷0)≤.10 and underlined if <.20)
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R2 .189 .240 .264 .542 .388 .408
max(VIF) 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.0
sBP .401 .956 .520 .379 .912 .489
BGAR(3) .859 .839 .782 .442 .825 .590
Table 12: Parameter estimates and diagnostics for tvolume and cvolume
(E(β) with P (β≷0) in parenthesis below;
E(β) in bold if P (β≷0)≤.10 and underlined if <.20)
Biscuits Breakfast cereals Soft drinks

















































R2 .270 .202 .199 .619 .261 .412
max(VIF) 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1
sBP .889 .465 .581 .143 .592 .437
BGAR(3) .223 .257 .862 .004 .769 .949
Table 13: Parameter estimates and diagnostics for trevenue and crevenue
(E(β) with P (β≷0) in parenthesis below;








































R2 .347 .221 .317 .436
max(VIF) 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.2
sBP .391 .823 .807 .373
BGAR(3) .607 .972 .628 1.000
Table 14: Parameter estimates and diagnostics for tcustomer and card
(E(β) with P (β≷0) in parenthesis below;
E(β) in bold if P (β≷0)≤.10 and underlined if <.20)
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4 How Nutrition Labels Alter Health Halos: Mis-
leading Nutrition Claims and Health Framing
(with Steffen Jahn and Yasemin Boztuğ)
A previous version of this paper (Study 3) is published as:
Elshiewy, Jahn, and Boztuğ (2014). The Effectiveness of Nutrition Labels in Fighting
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San Francisco, USA.
Part of this version is currently under 1st round review in Journal of the Association for
Consumer Research.
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4.1 Study 3: Introduction
The relevance to account for nutrition and health aspects in food marketing has reached
an all-time high. From this background, food manufacturers and retailers increasingly aim
to address this issue with a variety of means (Chandon and Wansink 2012; Mohr et al.
2012). For example, package-based claims and labels have become popular strategies to
influence consumer’s perceptions of the healthiness of food products (Chandon 2013). In
particular, marketers make use of nutrition claims (e.g., ‘low fat’) and voluntary nutrition
labels, posted on the front of the package, to emphasize the nutritional advantage of their
food products (Newman et al. 2014).
Decades of marketing and nutrition research was devoted to analyze how consumers pro-
cess, perceive and respond to nutrition claims and labels on food products (for reviews,
see Chandon and Wansink 2012; Chandon 2013; Hersey et al. 2013). One finding is that
nutrition claims increase the perceived healthiness of food products (Andrews et al. 1998;
Belei et al. 2012; Geyskens et al. 2007; Wansink and Chandon 2006). Studies using real
purchase data from supermarkets show that nutrition claims (especially ‘low fat’ claims)
have a positive impact on sales (Levy et al. 1985; Schucker et al. 1992; Teisl et al. 2001;
Balasubramanian and Cole 2002). The downside of these findings is that misleading nu-
trition claims can be responsible for overconsumption and, hence, obesity (Belei et al.
2012; Wansink and Chandon 2006). The so-called health-halo effect is mentioned to be
responsible for this outcome. For nutrition claims, such as ‘low fat’, consumers may tend
to overgeneralize the information from the claim and rate the product as being healthy
on other nutrients not mentioned in the claim (Andrews et al. 1998; Roe et al. 1999). The
perceived healthiness will be biased if the food product has, for example, a ‘low fat’ claim
but is high in sugar content. This means that consumers will overestimate the healthiness
of the food product and underestimate the food energy content which in the end will
result in overeating (Chandon and Wansink 2007).
Biased perceptions by misleading nutrition claims are assumed to be corrected by more
comprehensive nutrition information (Chandon 2013). Previous research has found that
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consumers change their product attitude and behavior when claim-induced healthiness
perceptions are disconfirmed by comprehensive nutrition disclosure (Ford et al. 1996;
Garretson and Burton 2000; Keller et al. 1997; Kozup et al. 2003). The change in nutri-
tion attitude results in a decrease in purchase intention of these food products as well as
a decrease in trust (Garretson and Burton 2000) and credibility towards the food man-
ufacturer (Keller et al. 1997; Kozup et al. 2003). It is questionable, however, if these
outcomes also occur in real-life settings as respondents in experimental settings may be
prone to less truncation to appear diligent and well-informed (Roe et al. 1999). Changes
in perceived healthiness and purchase intention, which will be attributed to a nutrition
claim disconfirmation, may suggest a specific behavior when considered in isolation. This
does not have to apply in a real-life purchase decision, where consumers tend to incorpo-
rate more complex motivations (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006).
Among the studies using supermarket purchase data, the effectiveness of comprehensive
nutrition disclosure in promoting healthier purchase behavior is mixed (for reviews, see
Hersey et al. 2013; Moorman 1996; Russo et al. 1986). Nevertheless, the prevalence of
voluntary front-of-pack nutrition labels on food products is steadily rising (Newman et al.
2014). Only a subset of consumers which are characterized by specific information pro-
cessing behavior, motivations and knowledge are assumed to respond to nutrition labels
(Burton and Kees 2012; Chandon 2013). Therefore, authors call for research to investigate
more nuanced effects of nutrition disclosure, like the ability of nutrition labels to correct
for misleading nutrition claims in real-life settings (Andrews et al. 2014).
Moreover, nutrition labels could additionally exert adverse effects. Most nutrition labels
present the nutrition values as a percentage of the recommended daily amount per serv-
ing. A lower ‘per serving basis’ results in lower nutrition values in total and percentage.
Consumers tend to evaluate the healthiness of food products by the values on the label
and neglect the ‘per serving basis’ which leads to the health-framing effect (Mohr et al.
2012). As with the misleading nutrition claims, consumers will repeatedly overestimate
the healthiness of the food product and underestimate the food energy content. Con-
sumers do not tend to consume the ‘per serving basis’ (Ueland et al. 2009) but rather
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consume a single entity (Geier et al. 2006) or are influenced by the package size (Chan-
don 2013). Hence, health framing becomes another mean for marketers to increase the
perceived healthiness of food products, leading to a health-halo effect which results in
overeating and potential obesity (Chandon and Wansink 2012).
Using supermarket purchase data, this study seeks to explore the relationship between
nutrition labels and health halos. We contend that front-of-pack nutrition labels can
fight health halos, but only for a subset of food products. Instead of a general effect on
healthful consumption, we argue that nutrition labels can evoke aversion behaviors to-
ward food products that try to mislead consumers and, hence, strategically try to exploit
health halos. That is, nutrition label introduction should lead to decreased consumption
of food that claims to be, for example, ‘low fat’ but is high in sugar. While in this case
a nutrition label could prevent a health halo, it may promote health halos by allowing
marketers to manipulate the ‘per serving basis’ for the percentage of recommended daily
amount (Mohr et al. 2012). We study the dual role of nutrition labels in altering health
halos. We use supermarket scanner data covering two years and a large number of pur-
chase transactions. We estimate a fixed-effects panel model to test our hypotheses, while
controlling for different explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity.
With the present research, we contribute to the food marketing literature in several ways.
First, we contend that nutrition labels do not affect food purchase behavior in general, but
have more nuanced effects. In contrast to the assumption that nutrition labels generally
decrease calorie intake or improve consumption of healthful food (or fail to achieve these
goals), we only expect effects for products that claimed to be healthful but turned out to be
rich in other unhealthy nutrients. This means that we suggest an “aversion effect” rather
than a general “calorie intake reduction effect.” Second, we show the differential effect of
nutrition label introduction on food sales. While the aversion effect is one outcome that
diminishes the consequences of health halos, serving size-related health framing is seen
as a strategy to increase consumption of less healthful food products. Third, this study
contributes to the growing number of studies using actual purchase data to investigate
the real-world consequences of food marketing related to health aspects.
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4.2 Study 3: Conceptual Background
Consumers that pursue the healthiness goal tend to choose products carrying a nutrition
claim such as ‘low fat’ (Belei et al. 2012; Wansink and Chandon 2006). One reason is
that these consumers could read a claim saying ‘low fat’ and infer that it is also low in
overall calories (and, hence, more healthy). This has become known as the health-halo
effect, a phenomenon that occurs when consumers infer the overall healthiness from one
single attribute (Chandon and Wansink 2007). If additional information on a nutrition
label supports such claims, it can even be expected that people will increasingly con-
sume this product (Wansink and Chandon 2006). Sometimes, however, nutrition labels
reveal that consumer inferences regarding the healthiness of the product are incorrect. In
this case, consumers correct their expectations after exposure to objective nutrition in-
formation (Burton et al. 2014). However, an interesting case remains where discrepancies
between expected and actual nutrition content is not based on poor nutrition knowledge
but strategic deception by food marketers.
Consider the case of yogurt. By nature, yogurt contains fat and people are aware of it,
making fat a relevant attribute for yogurt choice. Food manufacturer, then, have the
opportunity to reduce the amount of fat and to communicate the respective informa-
tion (e.g., ‘low fat’) on the food packaging. In order to keep the yogurt’s tastiness, the
same food manufacturer could increase the amount of sugar and other carbohydrates to
compensate for the fat reduction (Brennan and Tudorica 2008). Food manufacturers of-
ten substitute one unhealthful nutrient for another; hoping consumers would not notice
(Peretti 2012). The outcome is, that consumers may think they would eat a healthy yo-
gurt (which is low in fat) without paying attention to the (potentially) excessive amount
of sugar. The health-halo effect suggests that this systematic bias in calorie estimation
can induce justification processes that lead to increased consumption of the respective
yogurt (Chandon and Wansink 2007; Wansink and Chandon 2006).
We contend that, when detecting a mismatch between nutrition claim and content of
other unhealthy nutrients, consumers would be dissatisfied as their expectations are neg-
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atively disconfirmed (Oliver 2010). The nutritional properties of the food product do
not support the healthiness goal which is intended with the purchase. When food man-
ufacturers replace a salient unhealthful product attribute (e.g., fat content for yogurt)
with another unhealthful yet less salient attribute (e.g., sugar content) such practice is
comparable to covert marketing. Covert marketing is a “paid form of communication
in which the commercial source is concealed and the marketing message is passed off as
news [...] in an effort to minimize audience skepticism toward the message” (Ashley and
Leonard 2009, p. 213). Research has shown that consumers that become aware of covert
marketing by a brand they use have lower intentions to repurchase this brand (Ashley and
Leonard 2009). In a similar manner, consumers who become aware of marketer deception
through misleading nutrition claims may reduce their purchases of the respective food
product (aversion effect). Notably, without nutrition labels it is difficult to detect such
deception. Front-of-pack nutrition information, in contrast, allows simple assessment of
such misleading practices (Chandon 2013). In this case, the health halo may disappear
after nutrition label introduction.
The aversion effect does not only entail decreasing purchase of the “misleading products,”
but also stable purchase of those products that contain many calories without claiming
to be low in calories. For example, Greek yogurt is known to be rich in fat. According to
our theorizing, after introduction of a nutrition label consumers are expected to continue
buying it as it was never claimed to be healthful. Accordingly, there is no need to punish
sugar-rich or calorie-rich products per se. Rather, only sales of ‘low fat’ products that
contain high amounts of sugar are expected to decrease after label introduction. This
leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: The introduction of a front-of-pack nutrition label reduces sales of products with ‘low
fat’ claims that contain high amounts of sugar.
A second deception strategy marketers could use to make their products appear health-
ier (or less unhealthy) regards the serving size information. If a product contains high
amounts of fat and/or sugar, the calories per 100g will be high. However, if the food man-
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ufacturer decides to define 50g as a “typical serving size,” this health framing artificially
reduces the reported amount of calories per serving (Mohr et al. 2012). Yet, the actual
serving size is often one unit of the product (Geier et al. 2006) or determined by package
size (Scott et al. 2008). Hence, the biased calorie report can lead consumers to overeating.
Although consumers have the opportunity to detect this strategy when carefully reading
the nutrition label, intense information processing is required.
Unlike the mentioned aversion effect that may result from nutrition label introduction,
the health framing effect can lead to two different results. First, presentation of a small
‘per serving basis’ reduces the values of recommended daily amount on the nutrition label.
As a result, consumers may have biased (lower) calorie estimates which can lead them
to consume more units. In a series of experiments Mohr et al. (2012) manipulated the
‘per serving basis’ and showed effects on anticipated guilt of consumption, purchase in-
tentions, and choice behavior. Against this background, it is even possible that purchase
intentions and choice behaviors correspond to the degree of health framing, increasing
sales of products that use a small ‘per serving basis.’ A possible second result is that
consumers could notice the biased ‘per serving basis’ (since it is indicated on the label),
infer strategic reporting and, in a similar way as before, become averse to purchase the
food product. Of the two possible outcomes, results from existing research seems to fa-
vor the first (Mohr et al. 2012), leading to increased purchase of the respective product.
One reason is that the second outcome requires consumers to make a series of combined
inferences and projections regarding their future behavior (e.g., estimating their actual
serving size), which is less likely. This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: The introduction of a front-of-pack nutrition label increases sales of products accord-
ing to their degree of health framing.
In summary, we argue that the introduction of nutrition labels can alter health halos
in two ways. First, health halos should diminish for products that strategically try to
mislead consumers by reducing the amount of one unhealthy nutrient while, at the same
time, increasing the amount of another (less salient) unhealthy nutrient. Second, health
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halos should flourish for products that strategically use too small ‘per serving basis’ on
nutrition labels. We test this framework using supermarket scanner data spanning two
years.
4.3 Study 3: Data
Two datasets are utilized for our analysis, which have been provided by an European
supermarket chain.
The first dataset contains purchase transactions from the yogurt category of the retailer’s
own store brands. These purchase transactions were collected for two years as checkout
scanner data from 1,552 different supermarkets of the chain across the UK. The time span
of two years covers one year before and one year after label introduction. The purchase
transactions contain information of 25 different yogurt items which are identified by their
unique product code (UPC). In addition to the UPC, each purchase transaction provides
information on the shopping date, the purchased quantity (in units) and the actual unit
price (in pennies) paid at the checkout.
The second dataset contains product information for the UPC. Each UPC is described
by its unit size (in g) and if the product’s legal name refers to a ‘low fat’ nutrition claim.
The nutrition information which is disclosed to customers by the nutrition label is also
provided. The implemented label is the front-of-pack Guideline Daily Amount (GDA)
nutrition facts label. It displays the amount of calories (in kcal) as well as sugar, fat, sat-
urated fat and salt (in g) per serving together with the percentage of recommended daily
amount per serving. This percentage is calculated for an adult consuming 2,000 calories
per day (see Figure 7). To calculate our variables for the upcoming analysis the product
Figure 7: GDA label
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information for each UPC from the second dataset is merged to the corresponding UPC
in the dataset with the purchase transactions. For each purchase transaction, we convert
the unit size from g to kg and calculate the total sales (in kg) by multiplying the sold
quantity (in units) with the unit size. Moreover, we divide the unit price by unit size (in
kg) to obtain a standardized price per kg for each purchase transaction.
We aggregate the two variables from the purchase transactions on a weekly basis. This
type of aggregation helps capturing the best possible seasonal characteristics of the
measures in combination with a sufficient number of periods for parameter estimation
(t = 1, .., 104). For each UPC and each week, we calculate the sum of total sales in kg
of all corresponding transactions (saleskg). This measure will serve as our dependent
variable measuring the sales volume for each UPC on a weekly basis during the time span
of the study.
The price per kg is aggregated by the mean value for each UPC and week (price). This
variable serves as a control in the analysis. Label introduction is operationalized as a 0/1
dummy, with “0” for the weeks before, and “1” for the weeks after the label introduction
(label). This variable flags the absence and presence of the GDA nutrition label.
Next, we derive the measures that remain constant during the two-year time span. The
first variable indicates whether the yogurt contains a ‘low fat’ nutrition claim in the prod-
uct legal name visible on the front of the package (lowfat). Including the claim in the
legal name of the product is the common way the retailer uses nutrition claims. We use
a 0/1 dummy which classifies the yogurt as “1” if the product name contains a ‘low fat’
nutrition claim, else “0.” Furthermore, we calculate a variable that reveals if a product’s
sugar content should be classified as high (sugarhigh). We used the respective threshold
of 10g of sugar per 100g. Figure 8 shows a scatterplot with each yogurt regarding their
nutrition content (left panel).
Less than 25 different yogurt products are visible in the plots because some UPC are
superimposed upon each other. On the left panel, the vertical axis shows the amount of
fat in g per 100g and the horizontal axis shows the amount of sugar in g per 100g. These
values are objective measures of the healthiness of the yogurt products. The products are
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furthermore marked in accordance to their status of ‘low fat’ nutrition claim in the prod-
uct name (see legend in Figure 8, left panel). The hatched area marks the area where
the products are classified as high in sugar content as well as low in fat content. The
threshold of 3g fat per 100g as low is classified by the UK Food Standards Agency (2007)
and allows the use of a ‘low fat’ nutrition claim. We observe that 18 from the 25 yogurts
have a ‘low fat’ claim. From these 18 ‘low fat’ yogurts, 10 are high in sugar. Only one




























































Figure 8: Scatter plots: Sugar and fat in g per 100g (left panel) and Calories per 100g and ‘per
serving basis’ for yogurt (right panel)
GDA label displays the percentage of recommended daily amount based on the serving
size. Due to the voluntary introduction of the GDA label, the retailer has no requirements
regarding the ‘per serving basis.’ A lower ‘per serving basis’ leads to lower nutrition values
in total and percentage on the label, which leads to a healthier perception (Mohr et al.
2012). Therefore, we treat the ‘per serving basis’ for each UPC as a measure of health
framing by the retailer. The ‘per serving basis’ in the data set varies from 60g to 200g
in the yogurt category (see Figure 8, right panel). This leads to the interpretation of
smaller ‘per serving basis’ as higher levels of health framing. Accordingly, we multiply
each serving size with −1 and add the maximum value of 200, resulting in a measure
where higher values suggest higher degrees of health framing (healthframing). In Figure
8 (right panel), we present a scatterplot for the yogurt products according to their ‘per
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serving basis’ and the objective measure of healthiness as calories per 100g.
4.4 Study 3: Modeling
In our model, we assume that the latter explained variables affect sales volume. Therefore,
saleskgit is our dependent variable for UPC i at week t. Our model contains three different
types of explanatory variables. The variables with index it differ across UPC and week
(e.g. priceit). The explanatory variables with index i differ across UPC but are time-
invariant (e.g. lowfati) and the index t is for variables which differ across weeks but are
invariant across the UPC (e.g. labelt). δ, γ and β are the effects of the corresponding
explanatory variables on saleskgit. Our model also holds an intercept α and the error
term εit for UPC i and week t. The following equation represents the structure of our
model:
saleskgit = α + δ1labelt + γ1lowfati + γ2sugarhighi + γ3healthframingi + γ4kcali +
β1(label · lowfat)it + β2(label · sugarhigh)it +
β3(label · lowfat · sugarhigh)it + β4(label · healthframing)it +
β5(label · kcal)it + β6priceit + β7saleskgi(t−1) + εit (15)
Based on the longitudinal structure of our data, we estimate fixed-effects models to
account for unobserved heterogeneity across individual units (UPC) and time periods
(week). The main procedure of the fixed-effects model is to introduce dummy variables
for each UPC and week to allow for effects of omitted variables, which avoids endo-
geneity bias in the parameter estimates (Rossi 2014). This model is called the two-way
fixed-effects model (hereafter: 2W-FE). The 2W-FE model does not require the dummy
variables for the individual and time effects to enter the set of explanatory variables
(Hsiao 2003). With Y as the dependent variable and X as explanatory variables the data
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is transformed in the following manner:
Ỹit =Yit − Ȳi· − Ȳ·t + Ȳ (16)
X̃it =Xit − X̄i· − X̄·t + X̄ (17)
Ȳi· and X̄i· are the means for UPC i. Ȳ·t and X̄·t are the means for week t. Ȳ and X̄ are the
overall means. The 2W-FE model is a least square regression of Ỹit on X̃it (Baltagi 2008).
The 2W-FE model “sweeps out” the intercept, the variables with no variation within
each UPC and the variables with no variation within each week. Hereby, the parameter
estimates for these explanatory variables are missing but their influence captured with
the data transformation. From this, the parameter estimates (β) for the variables with
















− β̃(X̄·t − X̄) (20)
From this, our equation of the 2W-FE model holds:
saleskgit = β̃1(label · lowfat)it +
β̃2(label · sugarhigh)it +
β̃3(label · lowfat · sugarhigh)it +
β̃4(label · healthframing)it +
β̃5(label · kcal)it +
β̃6priceit + β̃7saleskgi(t−1) + µi + θt + ε̃it (21)
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We estimate two models to test our hypotheses. Our first model (Model 1) includes only
yogurt with ‘low fat’ nutrition claims (lowfat = 1, N = 18). This enables to assess the
effect of the misleading nutrition claim in comparison to products without misleading
nutrition claim. Therefore, we can exclude the explanatory variables (label · lowfat)it
and (label · lowfat · sugarhigh)it from equation (21). In this model, we test Hypothesis 1
with β̃2. We test our second hypothesis with β̃4. In our second model (Model 2), we use
all yogurt products (N = 25) and exclude (label · sugarhigh)it as explanatory variable
to avoid multicollinearity with (label · lowfat · sugarhigh)it, because these variables only
differ for one yogurt (high in sugar without nutrition claim). In Model 2, we test our first
hypothesis with β̃3 and the second, repeatedly, with β̃4.
We use a lagged dependent variable in our equations to account for time-dependence in
our models (saleskgi(t−1)). For fixed-effects models, this leads to correlation between the
lagged dependent variable and the error term (ε̃it) by construction. The resulting bias in
parameter estimates is not negligible for panel data with few numbers of time periods but
will diminish when T gets large (Baltagi 2008; Hsiao 2003). Nickell (1981) provides an
approximate formula for the bias in β̃7 in a fixed-effects model. With |β̃7| < 1 in dynamic
panel models and T = 104 in our data, this bias can not exceed |.02|. We can include
saleskgi(t−1) for first time period because we have saleskg for the week before t = 1.
We want to emphasize that our number of periods (T = 104) is more than sufficient to
account for this bias. Instrumental variable approaches which can be applied to account
for such deviations can yield in larger bias if instruments are weak or invalid (Rossi 2014)
especially when the number of individual units is small (Nelson and Startz 1990).
In dynamic panel models, the standard error of the parameter estimates can be biased by
heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation (Stock and Watson 2008) while the param-
eter estimates will be consistent. In case of biased standard errors the significance of our
parameter estimates will be incorrect and result in wrong hypothesis testing. We therefore
apply a so-called sandwich estimator to obtain a heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-
consistent (HAC) covariance matrix of our parameter estimates. Arellano (1987) suggests
a variance estimation that clusters the individual units in a fixed-effects model and com-
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putes the standard errors from a HAC covariance matrix. We follow Stock and Watson
(2008) who recommend this type of procedure for general serial correlation.
4.5 Study 3: Results
We present our results in Figure 9 and Table 15. In Figure 9, we plot the fixed effects for
each UPC i (µi) as density function (left panel) and week t (θt) as a line plot over the
time-span of the study (right panel). The fixed-effects plot for both models are similar,
with neglectable differences for µi, therefore, we only show the fixed effects for the model




































no GDA label with GDA label
Figure 9: Plots of fixed effects for UPC (left panel) and week (right panel)
The fixed effects for the weeks capture common seasonal effects and trends. Especially
the two Christmas periods with fewer purchase opportunities and the following period
with increased demand for restocking are clearly visible. A slight downward trend is also
apparent. These time-effects are captured in the fixed effects, so that the parameter es-
timates for hypothesis testing are unbiased regarding seasonality and trends. The fixed
effects for the UPC show time-invariant heterogeneity between the yogurt products.
In Table 15, the parameter estimates are presented in bold with the robust t-values in
parenthesis below. We use the HAC covariance matrix to calculate the standard errors
which yield into the robust t-values. We want to emphasize that our number of periods
82
(T = 104) is sufficient to account for the bias of lagged dependent variables in fixed-effects
models. Our parameter estimate for the lagged dependent variable (β̃7) is .79 in both mod-
els. With T = 104, this produces a bias in these estimates by -.018. The effect on the
standard errors, other parameter estimates and their standard errors does not exceed this
deviation for our magnitudes of β̃7 (Kiviet 1995). Therefore, we neglect this deviation
on the second decimal for our hypothesis testing. This avoids potential larger biases for
alternative methods which aim to correct for this deviation but were mainly established
for panels with large numbers of units and small numbers of time periods. The inclusion
Yogurt
Model 1 (N = 18) Model 2 (N = 25)
label · lowfat (β̃1) 87.85*
(2.41)
label · sugarhigh (β̃2) -143.37***
(-4.26)
label · lowfat · sugarhigh (β̃3) -66.17**
(-2.76)

















Table 15: Parameter estimates and model fit for yogurt.
β in bold with robust t-value in parenthesis below
Robust p-values: <0.001=*** / <0.01=** / <0.05=* / <.10=+
of the lagged dependent variable (saleskgt−1 ) furthermore accounts for time-dependence.
We also estimate our models without the lagged dependent variable. We do not obtain
different results with respect to signs or significance of the parameter estimates. Changes
in the magnitude of the parameter estimates from the models when including the lagged
dependent variable are connected with biases arising because the time-dependence of the
yogurt demand is omitted. From this, as well as substantially larger Adjusted R2, we con-
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clude that the dynamic models show substantially higher model fit and therefore should
not be neglected for testing our hypothesis.
The parameter estimates of price are negative and significant in both models. This rela-
tionship is according to the “law of demand,” thus, we control for this effect. The effect
of the lagged dependent variable saleskgt−1 is positive and significant in both models and
captures the influence of demand in the previous period for the current period.
We test our first hypothesis with the parameter estimate β̃2 in the model with only ‘low
fat’ yogurts (Model 1). In this model, all yogurts with high sugar (sugarhigh = 1) have
a ‘low fat’ nutrition claim, therefore label · sugarhigh captures the effect of the nutrition
label introduction on sales of yogurt with low fat claims that contain high amounts of
sugar. The parameter estimate is negative and significant (β̃2 = −143.37, p-value=<.001).
This confirms our first hypothesis in Model 1. The purchase volume for yogurt products
with ‘low fat’ claims that contain high amounts of sugar decreases after nutrition label
introduction. In Model 1, we test our second hypothesis with the parameter estimate of
healthframing. The effect is positive and significant (β̃4 = 0.66, p-value=<.10). This
confirms our second hypothesis in Model 1. We observe that health framing with the ‘per
serving basis’ on the nutrition label increases sales for ‘low fat’ yogurt.
In Model 2, we test our hypotheses using all yogurt products (N = 25). For Hypoth-
esis 1, we use β̃3, which captures the effect on sales volume of all ‘low fat’ yogurt with
high sugar content after the label introduction. The parameter estimate is negative and
significant (β̃3 = −66.17, p-value=<.01). The effect of healthframing is positive and
significant (β̃4 = 0.61, p-value=<.10) in Model 2. Therefore, we can repeatedly confirm
both hypotheses in Model 2.
4.6 Study 3: Conclusions
In summary, our results show that nutrition labels can correct for misleading nutrition
claims. The sales in kg decreased significantly for yogurt with ‘low fat’ claims but high
sugar content after nutrition label introduction.
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Our results contribute to the growing literature in food marketing by revealing that con-
sumers show aversion towards food products that use misleading claims. As assumed by
Chandon (2013), nutrition labels appear able to correct for health halos induced by mis-
leading ‘low fat’ nutrition claims. While our results can certify an impact on sales by an
uncovered scam further impact on attitudes towards the food manufacturer (Kozup et al.
2003) may lead to even more adverse consequences in a real-life setting. With increasing
prevalence of nutrition labels on food products, marketers should stop using misleading
nutrition claims to avoid potential losses. Federal agencies should regard nutrition labels
as a mean to protect consumers from overeating induced by misleading claims. We ex-
pect the aversion effect to be higher, the easier consumers can uncover the scam (see e.g.
Ford et al. 1996). This makes front-of-pack labeling schemes like the Traffic-Light-System
appear more attractive compared to numerical nutrition labels like the Guideline-Daily-
Amount label. In the case of the Traffic-Light-System, high nutrition content would be
accentuated with a red colored background, so that consumers would just have to search
for colors instead of processing numbers.
While our results show that nutrition labels are effective in the case of misleading claims,
we observe that serving size manipulation can lead to increased sales, thus consumption.
The higher the degree of health framing, which is chosen by the retailer, the higher the in-
crease in sales after nutrition labeling. With our results, we support the findings of Mohr
et al. (2012) and, furthermore, reveal that the magnitude of health framing is relevant.
The effect in the yogurt category can be explained by the utilitarian nature of this food
category, where consumers seek healthier options.
From our results, marketers appear able to increase sales by health framing. Although
this strategy may currently appear attractive, consumers could possibly uncover this ma-
nipulation tactic and respond according to the aversion effect. Implications for public
policy are that binding rules for the recommended ‘per serving basis’ for nutrition values
can prevent overeating induced by health framing. This should result in standardization
for this basis on nutrition labels to increase comparability of food products healthiness.
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5 General Conclusions
Our major findings from the three studies contribute to the literature of nutrition labeling
in several ways.
We found that price has a large impact on sales, product choice and energy intake, while
the effectiveness of nutrition labels is overestimated. With this result, we support the
findings of a review by Chandon and Wansink (2012). Providing financial incentives for
healthy purchase behavior or penalizing unhealthy purchases can therefore be considered
helpful to promote healthier purchase behavior (Yang et al. 2012). Recent findings by Wa-
terlander et al. (2013) have found that financial incentives in combination with nutrition
information support healthier purchase behavior. Even though our results can support
the findings that the purchased amount of nutrition content is influenced by price, re-
search by Talukdar and Lindsey (2013) has found that these demand-response patterns
are not necessarily symmetric for healthy and unhealthy food products. The authors
found that for healthy food, demand sensitivity is greater for a price increase than for a
price decrease. For unhealthy food, the opposite is revealed. Therefore, price should not
be considered as a panacea for promoting healthier purchase behavior.
Nutrition labels do not appear effective for a substantial change of consumer behavior. A
number of reasons have been identified in our three studies. As assumed by Jacoby et al.
(1977), loyalty towards food products will lead to truncation of product package process-
ing and, therefore, people might not recognize the label. Moreover, loyal customers may
not be ready to bear the costs of changes in consumer behavior. In our disaggregated
models in Study 1, we have identified very strong effects of loyalty on choice behavior, so
that the nutrition label introduction was not effective.
Our results from Study 2 and 3 suggest that lower processing costs for the evaluation of
the food products healthiness can lead to healthier purchase behavior. For example, in
Study 2 we found a slight decrease in sugar volume for products where consumers only
had to evaluate sugar content on the nutrition label. This finding is comparable to the
results found by Russo et al. (1986). Only nutrition disclosure of sugar content in a simple
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per spoon unit led to healthier purchases in their experiments. In Study 3, we have also
found that sugar content on the nutrition label with an easily recognizable great differ-
ence to other nutrients (low in fat but high in sugar) led to healthier purchase behavior.
From this, we contend that lower processing costs can have a positive influence on the
effectiveness of nutrition labels.
Furthermore, the results from Study 3 suggest that the response is highly influenced by
the difference between expected and actual nutrition content. This finding is supported by
the results in Study 2, where utilitarian food products, which are known to be unhealthy
and consumed for indulgence (Belei et al. 2012) showed no tendencies towards healthier
purchases after label introduction. These assumptions have repeatedly been stated by
authors (Burton et al. 2009, 2014) and are confirmed by our results.
One major finding from Study 3 is that a voluntary nutrition label, which is mainly in-
troduced as a marketing strategy, can easily be used as a tool to manipulate perceived
healthiness. From this background, we emphasize the importance of public policy to
increase efforts towards higher regulation standards for voluntary nutrition labels. Espe-
cially, future research must differ between nutrition labels as public policy instrument or
as part of food marketing. The objectives and, accordingly, the design of the labels differ
substantially between the two entities responsible for the introduction.
For those with an interest in promoting healthier purchase behavior, we recommend to
emphasize their efforts toward increasing consumers’ motivation to purchase healthier
food products. Nutrition labels can play a supporting role by providing knowledge. The
fact that consumers prefer taste over health should especially be considered. Vyth et al.
(2010) recommend higher attention towards such “hedonistic aspects” to stimulate con-
sumers to chose nutritionally favorable food products.
As stated by Lachat and Tseng (2013, p. 382) there is still “an urgent need to conduct real-
life intervention studies with nutrition labels that measure the effect on hard outcomes.”
From our results, we furthermore recommend that these real-life intervention studies must
account for heterogeneous response of consumers to nutrition labeling. Future research
with experimental field studies will be able to manipulate more of the possible interven-
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tions which are assumed to promote healthier purchase behavior. In particular, the role
of nutrition labeling in increasing knowledge should remain the focus of future research.
The nutrition labels should be considered as a supporting tool for other interventions (i.e.
price, product assortment) which have the potential to increase consumers’ motivation to
purchase healthier food products. Non-Use Benefits of nutrition label use (Caswell and
Padberg 1992; Padberg 1977), which occurs if food manufacturer compete in these prod-
uct attributes to serve consumers’ demand for nutritionally optimized products has not
been proved to support healthier product development and consumption so far (Moorman
et al. 2012).
“You can give me the information but you can’t make me stop eating the six cream cakes,
can you? I have to make that decision for myself.”
(Member of a group discussion from Barker et al. 2012)
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